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11.1 Introduction and Conclusions 
This paper addresses two unanswered questions regarding exchange mar- 
ket  intervention operations that  leave money supplies unchanged: (1) what 
role should such intervention operations play in open economy financial pol- 
icy, and (2)  do they have significant effects on macroeconomic variables.’ 
First,  several  versions of  a  model  in  which  intervention operations have 
effects are used to  delineate the role of  these operations in macroeconomic 
financial policy.’  Then, attention is focused on some recent theoretical and 
empirical studies relevant for assessing the likelihood that  intervention op- 
erations have significant effects. 
According to the view adopted here, the home authorities conduct finan- 
cial policy using two kinds of  financial market operations: (1) intervention 
operations, exchanges of  home (currency) securities for foreign (currency) 
Discussions  with  Matthew  Canzoneri, Jo Anna  Gray,  Peter  Isard, Maurice  Obstfeld, and 
Kenneth  Rogoff  led  to  improvements  in  this  paper.  This  paper  represents  the  views  of  the 
author and should not  be interpreted  as representing  the views of  the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System or other members of its staff. 
I. Stein (1963), Mundell (1968). and Niehdns (1968) were pioneers in  the analysis of open 
economy financial policy.  Recent contributions include those of Modigliani and Askari (1973), 
Hamada (1974), Sweeney (1976), Tower and Willett (1976), Turnovsky (1976, 1983). Fischer 
(1977).  Boyer  (1978,  1980), Parkin  (1978).  Flood  (1979), Henderson  (1979,  1980,  1982). 
Kaminow (1979), Bryant (1980), Frenkel (1980), Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Artis and Cur- 
rie (1981). Mussa (1981), Wallich  and Gray  (1981), Weber  (1981), Argy (1982). Canzoneri 
(1982). Jones (1982), and Canzoneri and Gray (1983). 
2.  Only in section  11.10 is there brief mention of the use of  intervention policy to counter 
“disorderly  markets”  or such features of  exchange market dynamics as runs or bandwagons. 
Shafer (1982) and Wonnacott (1982) address these issues among others. 
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securities  with  private  agents, and  (2)  monetary  operations,  exchanges  of 
home money for home securities with private  agent^.^  The intervention  op- 
eration just described  is often  referred  to  as  ‘‘sterilized  intervention”  be- 
cause it  leaves both the home money supply and the foreign money supply 
unchanged. 
The role  of  intervention  policy  is explored  in  the  context  of  a discrete- 
time  stochastic  model  in  which  agents have rational  expectations.  The de- 
scription of  this model in section  ll  .2 reveals that it has two features which 
are especially  important.  First,  intervention  operations  affect  macroecon- 
omic variables. This feature is an implication of the assumptions that private 
agents regard  home  and  foreign  securities as imperfect substitutes and that 
private agents do not treat the security holdings of the  authorities as being 
implicitly a part of  their own portfolios.  Second, contemporaneous financial 
policy  feedback  rules  can  dampen  the  variance  of  employment  caused  by 
disturbances  in  the  markets  for goods  and  assets even though  agents have 
rational expectations.  This  feature is a consequence of  the assumption that 
labor market participants set a base  nominal  wage and, in some versions of 
the model, an indexing parameter before other markets meet. 
Whether one open economy financial policy regime is better than another 
usually  depends on the  source of  disturbances  to the  economy.  In  section 
1 1.3 this observation is illustrated by a comparison of the effects of different 
kinds of transitory disturbances to a single open economy with no indexing 
under two alternative  pure  financial policy  regimes.  Under  an  “aggregates 
constant policy”  the money supply is kept unchanged and there is no inter- 
vention,  so the interest rate and the  exchange  rate vary  when  disturbances 
are experienced. Under a “rates  constant policy”  monetary operations  and 
intervention  operations  are  employed  to keep  the  interest  rate  and  the  ex- 
change rate  fixed.  It  is  shown that  for disturbances  to  the  market  for the 
home good an aggregates constant policy results in  less variation in employ- 
ment  and  that for disturbances  to financial  markets  a rates  constant  policy 
results in less variation in employment. Then it is argued that similar results 
can be obtained when  the  economy is  subject  to  one  kind  of  permanent 
disturbance as well as to transitory disturbances. 
Introducing  indexing necessitates qualifications to some of  the results for 
pure financial policy regimes. As explained in section  1 1.4, for disturbances 
that directly affect only financial markets, a rates constant policy still results 
3. Throughout this paper it is the currency of denomination of  a security, and not the country 
of residence of  its issuer or holder, that determines whether that security is a home security or 
a foreign security. 
4.  Dooley (1979) provides a thorough discussion of  intervention operations. Girton and Hen- 
derson (1977) compare the effects of  intervention operations and monetary operations in a two- 
country model of financial markets.  Black (1980) describes experience with intervention policy 
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in less employment variation.  However,  for disturbances that directly affect 
the  market  for  the  home  good,  the  results  are  less  clear-cut  with  in- 
dexing. 
To show that the authorities may  be  able to reduce the variance of  em- 
ployment  below  that  implied  by  either pure  financial  policy  regime  is  the 
main purpose of section 11.5. The authorities may improve the outcome for 
currently unobserved  employment by adopting a contemporaneous  financial 
policy  feedback  rule  that  relates  a financial  variable  chosen  as an  instru- 
ment-say,  the exogenous supply of home (currency) assets-to  a financial 
variable  chosen  as  an  information  variable-say,  the  exchange  rate-be- 
cause the information variable conveys current though  incomplete informa- 
tion about the sources of disturbances.  Under general conditions macroeco- 
nomic outcomes  will  be  better  if  the  financial  authorities in  a single open 
economy facing transitory disturbances neither rigidly  fix the exchange rate 
nor  allow  it  to  fluctuate  freely.  In  fact, outcomes  may  be  better  if  they 
reinforce the movement of the exchange rate that would occur if  there were 
no intervention by  “leaning with the wind.” 
Section 11.6 is a digression from the topic of intervention policy made in 
order to  consider further  how  exchange  rate  movements  and  interest  rate 
movements  can be  used  together  to make inferences  about  the  sources of 
unobserved  disturbances.  Not  surprisingly,  it  is  found  that  exchange  rate 
movements provide helpful additional information but that they do not com- 
pletely  resolve  the  problems  faced  by  the  authorities  in  their  attempts  to 
discover the sources of disturbances. 
Limited support for the contention that intervention  policy can be helpful 
in dampening  “vicious  circles”  is provided in section 11.7. It is shown that 
when wage contracts are indexed the trade-off  between  output variance and 
price variance can be improved when the exchange rate is fixed. 
In  section  11.8 attention  is  turned  to  the  interactions  in  a  two-country 
world economy that must be considered when choosing financial policies. It 
is emphasized  that the overall stance of intervention  policy is the result  of 
the  intervention  policies  of  both  countries.  Then  it  is shown  that  for  two 
kinds of transitory disturbances the two countries would agree on what the 
overall  stance of  intervention  policy  should  be,  while  for another kind  of 
transitory disturbance a policy conflict would arise. 
The message  of  section  11.9 is that,  strictly speaking, imperfect  substi- 
tutability  among  securities  denominated  in  different  currencies  is  neither 
necessary  nor  sufficient for intervention  operations  to have  significant  ef- 
fects. As  noted  in  section  11.10, recent  rejections of  the joint hypothesis 
that securities denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes and 
that expectations  are rational are consistent with  the effects of intervention 
operations  being  significant.  However, the  results  of  direct  tests  for these 
effects suggest that any such effects are quite weak. 362  Dale W. Henderson 
11.2 The Model 
This section is a description of  a discrete-time stochastic model of a two- 
country world economy in which agents have rational  expectation^.^ Special 
cases of  this model are employed in the next six sections. 
First,  attention is  focused on  the  real  sector of  the  model.  The  model 
contains two goods each of  which  is produced in only one country but  is 
consumed in both. Home output (Y)  must be equal to aggregate demand for 
the home good, and foreign output (Y)  must be equal to the aggregate de- 
mand for the foreign good: 
* 
Here and in what follows, all coefficients except intercept terms are positive. 
Increases in home and foreign output raise income at home and abroad and, 
therefore, spending on both goods.6 It is assumed that the marginal propen- 
sities to consume the home good  (yl),  to consume the  foreign good (j,), 
and to save (s =  1  - yI - PI) are the same in both countries and are all 
positive.’  Aggregate demand for each good depends negatively on the ex- 
pected real interest rate on home securities (r)  and on foreign securities (?) 
because  increases  in  expected  real  interest  rates  raise  home  and  foreign 
saving. 
Aggregate demand  for the home good depends positively  on the  (loga- 
rithm of  the) relative price of  the foreign good (e + $ -  p).  The variables 
e, $,  and p  are, respectively, the (logarithms of  the) exchange rate defined 
as the home currency price of  foreign currency, the foreign currency price 
of  the foreign good, and the home currency price of the home good. Aggre- 
gate demand for the foreign good depends negatively on the relative price 
of  the foreign good.  An  increase in  the relative price of  the foreign good 
shifts home  and  foreign spending toward  (away from) the home (foreign) 
good and  raises  (lowers) foreign (home) income measured in terms of  the 
5. This model is a linear approximation to a nonlinear model sketched out in  the Appendix. 
Explicit expressions for the approzimation coefficients are presented in the Appendix. 
6. It is possible to add Y and Y  together because units  are chosen so that  the relative  price 
of the foreign good is one in  the equilibrium about which the approximation is made. 
7.  Home and foreign residents are  assumed to have the same tastes so that  shifts of  wealth 
between  countries  through current  account surpluses and  deficits will  have no  effects on the 
variables of the model. Without this assumption a more complicated, dynamic analysis would 
he required. 363  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
home (foreign) good, thereby stimulating (restraining) spending on the home 
(foreign) good. It is assumed that trade is initially balanced so that the effect 
of  an  increase  in the relative  price of  the  foreign  good  on  the  demand for 
the foreign good is equal in absolute value to the effect on  the demand for 
the home good.’ 
A depreciation of  the home currency-that  is, a rise in e-raises  (lowers) 
home  and  foreign  wealth  measured  in  terms  of  the  home  (foreign)  good, 
thereby reducing  (increasing)  world  saving measured  in terms of the home 
(foreign) good and raising (lowering) aggregate demand for the home (for- 
eign) good.’  An  increase in the home (foreign) currency price of the home 
(foreign)  good  lowers  home  and  foreign  wealth  measured  in  terms  of  the 
home (foreign) good thereby raising  world  saving measured in terms of  the 
home (foreign) good and reducing aggregate demand for the home (foreign) 
good. The effect of a depreciation of the home currency on demand for the 
home good is smaller in absolute value than the effect of an increase in the 
home currency price of the home good (y5 < y6) because a rise in e raises 
the home good value of only the foreign currency  component of  home and 
foreign  wealth,  but  an  increase  in  p  lowers  the  home  good  value  of  all 
components of  home  and  foreign  wealth;  j5 < $6  by  an  analogous  ar- 
gument. 
Positive values of ci  represent increases in the demand for the home good 
at the expense of demand for the foreign good. This stochastic  variable and 
those introduced below  to represent other disturbances are assumed to have 
zero means and to be mutually and serially uncorrelated. 
The expected real interest rates on  home securities and foreign  securities 
are 
(4) 
The variables  i and  ? represent the nominal  interest rates on home and for- 
eign  securities.  The  variables  q  and  4  represent  the  (logarithms  of  the) 
home currency and foreign currency prices of the world consumption bundle: 
(5) 
(6) 
The constant h represents the proportion of spending that would be allocated 
q = hp + (1 -  h)(e + $1, 
(T  = h(p -  e) + (1 - h)$. 
8. See the Appendix for proof that the assumption of balanced trade has this implication. 
9. The  assumptions  about  asset  preferences  made  below  imply  that  the  residents of each 
country  have net  claims  denominated in  the  currency of the  other country, that  is, that  there 
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to the home good  by  residents  of  both  countries  if  all  of  the disturbance 
terms were zero. From (5) and (6) it follows that 4 and 8 are given by 
(7)  ij = kjj + (1 - k)(Z + p”), 
5 = he  -  Z) + (1 -  k)p”, 
where ij, 8,  jj, Z, and p”  are the constant values of q, 8,  p,  e,  and $ that all 
agents expect in any period to prevail  in the next period. 
According to the production  functions for home and foreign output, 
(9)  Y  = xo  + XIL  + x*p, 
(10)  1*.  = ko + 
home output depends positively on home employment (L),  and foreign out- 
put  depends positively  on  foreign  employment (,?).”  Positive  values  of  p 
represent increases in the (marginal) productivity of labor. 
Firms and workers in each country enter into a labor contract each period 
before other markets meet to avoid the costs of ongoing wage negotiations. 
This contract has two provisions, an employment rule and a nominal  wage 
indexing rule.  According  to  the  employment  rule,  workers  must  supply 
whatever amount of  labor firms want at the realized  real  wage.  Given  this 
rule, firms in each country employ labor up to the point at which the (loga- 
rithms of the) marginal product of labor and the real wage are equal: 
(1 1)  w -  p = lo - 1,L  + f3, 
***  w-p=lo- ** 
1 ,L. 
The variables w and ib represent  (the logarithms of) home and foreign nom- 
inal  wages  measured  in  home  and  foreign  currency,  respectively.  The 
amount of labor employed in the home (foreign) country  may be greater or 
less than the constant “full  employment”  amount, Lf (Lf),  that  home (for- 
eign) workers would  supply in the absence of  the labor contract. 
(13) 
* 
The nominal wage indexing rules are 
w - w  = p(q -  ij), 
ib- 
* 
In each country an indexing parameter (p  or p)  determines what fraction of 
deviations of the price index from its base value (ij or $) will be reflected  in 
deviations  of  the same sign in the nominal  wage from its base value (w  or 
10. It  is  shown  in  the  Appendix  that  the  production  function  of  equation  (9) is  a  linear 
approximation of  a nonlinear production function with a multiplicative disturbance. 365  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
z).  The base values W  and 8 are the values  of  w  and 6 which  would  be 
consistent with full employment if all disturbances were zero: 
(15) 
-  w -  p  = lo - l]LP 
As before, ij and 8 are the constant values of  9 and 4 expected in any period 
to prevail  in the next. In  order to calculate j7, 3,  and Z so that they can set 
w  and z and ij and 8, labor market participants  must know the parameters 
of  the economic model  and  the  values  at which  the  financial  authorities’ 
policy instruments would be set if all disturbances were zero. 
Now attention is focused on the financial sector of the model, which consists 
of markets for three assets: home money, foreign money, and home securi- 
ties.”  Residents of  each country  hold  the money of  their  country  but  not 
the money of the other country.”  The supply of home money (M)  must equal 
the demand for home money  by home residents, and the supply of  foreign 




M  = mo + mlp + m2Y -  m3i -  m4(i + .?  - e) 
+r+& 
*  **  N  = io  + A$  + ffzY - x3(i -  2 + e) -  n41. 
Home (foreign)  money demand depends positively  on the home (foreign) 
currency price of  the home (foreign)  good and  on home  (foreign)  output. 
Increases in both of these variables raise the transactions demands for money 
balances.I3 In  a  given  country money  demand depends negatively  on  the 
nominal  interest  rate on securities  denominated in  that  country’s currency 
and on the expected nominal return on securities  denominated in the other 
country’s  currency  measured  in  terms  of  the  given  country’s  currency, 
which is equal to the nominal  interest rate on securities denominated in the 
other country’s currency plus the expected rate of  depreciation  of the given 
country’s currency. Positive  values of  y (6) represent  shifts of  home resi- 
I 1.  The market for the fourth asset, foreign securities,  can be omitted by  Walras’s law; for 
12.  That is, there is no “currency  substitution”  in this model. 
13.  The foreign  price  level does not  appear  in equation  (17), nor does the  exchange  rate 
appear as a separate argument.  These variables are absent because, as is  spelled out in  more 
detail in  the Appendix, equation  (17) is  an  approximation  of  a demand  function for nominal 
balances of  the  form PYA(.), which has  a real  incoTe elasticity of  unity.  If &he  demand  for 
nominal balances were of the form [hP + (1 - h)EPlg{PY/[hP + (1  ~  h)EP],  .}  where the 
real income elasticity was less than one, then f~  and e would appear in equation (17). Assuming 
that the real income elasticity of  the demand for nominal balances is one simplifies the deriva- 
tion of  several results, particularly those for a productivity shock in an economy with no index- 
ing.  Under plausible assumptions  the qualitative results would be the same if the real income 
elasticity were less than unity, as is shown in Henderson (1982). 
completeness the equilibrium condition for this market is included in the Appendix, 366  Dale W. Henderson 
dents’ asset preferences toward home money and away from home (foreign) 
securities. 
The supply of  home securities (B)  must equal the demand for these secu- 
rities by both home and foreign residents: 
(19) 
* 
B  = bo - bg - b2Y + b3i - b4(i + Z - e) 
+ bs(i -  Z  + e) - b,T  + b7e - b$ 
* 
- bgY  - y  + E. 
It is assumed that both home and foreign residents determine the home cur- 
rency  amount  that  they  will  hold  in  securities by  subtracting their money 
demands measured in home currency from the home currency value of their 
wealth  and  allocate the same fraction of  this amount to home securities.I4 
The resulting demand for home securities depends negatively on the prices 
of  the home and foreign goods and on home and foreign output. increases 
in prices and outputs raise the transactions demands for money of both home 
and foreign residents partly at the expense of  their demands for home cur- 
rency  securities. It follows that bl < ml and b2 < m2. It  is also assumed 
that both  home  and  foreign residents regard  the  three  assets they  hold  as 
strict gross substitutes. Therefore, the demand for home securities depends 
positively on  the nominal interest rate  on  home  securities and  on  the ex- 
pected rate of  return on home securities measured in terms of  foreign cur- 
rency, and b3 > m3.  In  addition, the demand  for home securities depends 
negatively on the nominal interest rate on foreign securities and on the ex- 
pected rate of  return on foreign securities measured  in terms of  home cur- 
rency.Is The demand for home securities depends positively on the exchange 
rate because a depreciation of the home currency raises the home currency 
value of  world wealth minus world money demand. The demand for home 
securities depends negatively (positively) on the disturbance term y (E).  Pos- 
itive values of  y (E) represent decreases (increases) in the demand for home 
securities matched by  increases (decreases) in the demand for home money 
(foreign securities). 
11.3 Transitory Disturbances and Alternative Pure Financial Policies 
in a Single Open Economy with No Indexing 
In this section a specialized version of  the model of  section 11.2 is em- 
ployed to analyze the effects on home employment of  some transitory dis- 
turbances to macroeconomic equilibrium in  the home economy under two 
14. The explanation  for the  assumption  that home and foreign  residents allocate the same 
fraction of  the home  currency  value of  the difference  between their wealth  and  their money 
demand to home securities is the same as the explanation in n. 7 for the assumption that these 
agents have the same tastes for goods. 
15.  i - 2 + e and  i  are the opportunity costs of  holding money rather than the two types 
of securities in  the foreign country. 
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pure financial policy regimes, an aggregates constant policy and a rates con- 
stant policy.’6 The analysis is simplified by the assumption that there is no 
indexing in the home country (k = 0). 
As a first step the behavior of the home and foreign financial authorities 
is described. The balance sheet of the financial authorities in the home coun- 
try has the money supply as a liability and both home and foreign securities 
as assets. The home authorities’ holdings of foreign securities are their only 
foreign  exchange reserves.  At a given  exchange  rate,  changes in  the three 
balance sheet items must  sum to zero,  so values for only two of  the three 
items can be chosen  independently.  It is assumed that the home authorities 
do not observe home employment, home output, and the price of the home 
good in  the current period.  They can choose  as policy  instruments and set 
values for any two of four financial variables:  the home money supply (M), 
private holdings of home securities (B),  the interest rate on home securities 
(i),  and  the exchange rate  (e).  The values  of  the  other two  variables  are 
determined  by  the model.  The description of  the home authorities’ balance 
sheet implies that if the home authorities seek to change B without changing 
M,  they must also change the supply of foreign securities available to private 
agents through intervention operations.  Under an aggregates constant policy 
M and B are kept unchanged,  while under a rates constant policy M and B 
are allowed to vary to keep i and e constant.  Under each policy regime the 
authorities set and announce the same values for two financial policy instru- 
ments before markets meet each period; that is, they either do not observe 
or,  more  realistically,  elect not  to respond  to  movements  in  the  financial 
variables for which they do not set values. The announced values of the two 
policy  instruments  can  be  chosen  arbitrarily  because  home  country  labor 
market participants set the base nominal wage so that the expected value of 
L is equal to Lr given these announced values. 
Since the objective of  this and the next five sections is to focus on finan- 
cial  policymaking  in  a  single open economy, somewhat  different  assump- 
tions are made about the information available to the foreign authorities and 
the use they make of  this information.  It is assumed that the foreign author- 
ities can observe the level of foreign output (Y) and the price of the foreign 
good  @) in the current period and that they act so as to keep these variables 
as well as the interest rate on foreign securities (i) fixed. ” 
Given the nature of the disturbances  and the behavior of  the authorities, 
it  is rational for agents to expect in any period  that the values of  the price 
of the home good and the exchange rate in the next period  will be equal to 
* 
* 
16. The  type of analysis used  in this  section was first employed in  the  context of a closed 
economy by Poole (1970) and has been extended by Friedman (1975). 
17. The foreign authorities must use  monetary operations and two fiscal policy instruments, 
for example, the level of balanced budget government spending and its allocation between the 
home good  and  the  foreign good, to  achieve  these  constant  values.  Flood  (1979) makes an 
interesting alternative set of assumptions about the behavior of the foreign authorities. 368  Dale W. Henderson 
the constants j?  and  Z,  respectively.I8  In  addition, it is  rational  for labor 
market participants  in the home country to set the base nominal wage at the 
constant value implied by (15) each period before other markets meet. 
As a second step the specialized version of the model used in this section 
is expressed in more compact form. The equilibrium conditions for the mar- 
kets for the home good, home money, and home securities become19 
(20)  0  =  -yLL  -  y;; +  Ye& + a t  YpP, 
(21)  A =  mJ  - mil +  me$  -mpP  + Y  + 6, 
(22)  B  1  -bLL  +  b,:  +  b,C  + bpp -  Y  + E, 
where 
YL = Ypll + YYXI, 
Y, = YZ, 
Ye = Up -  Y2 -  Y6 + Y59 
m,  = mpll + myxl,  bL = bpll + byxl, 
m, = m3, 
me  = m49 
bi  = 63  + bg, 
be = b4  + b5  + b7, 
Yp  = Y*  -  YYX2t  mp = mp -  myx2,  b, = bp - byx2, 
and 
Yp = Y4 f b2  + y3)h + Y69  mp  = ml, bp = bl, 
YY = s + $1,  my = m2, by = b2. 
A circumflex over a variable  indicates the deviation of  that variable from its 
constant expected value. It is assumed that relative price and wealth effects 
outweigh possibly “perverse”  expected real interest rate effects so that ye is 
positive.  With employment held constant, an increase in the productivity of 
labor tends to create excess demand for the home good because it lowers its 
price but tends to create excess supply of the home good because it increases 
the amount supplied. It is assumed that the first effect dominates so that yp 
is positive.  Assumptions embodied in (9), (17), and (19) imply that  an in- 
18. This statement  is strictly true only if  it  is assumed that there are “no speculative bub- 
bles.”  Sargent (1973) explains the implications of  this assumption in  the context of  a closed 
economy.  Parkin  (1978),  Flood  (1979).  Roper  and  Turnovsky  (1980).  Wallich  and  Gray 
(1981), and Weber  (1981) analyze open  economy  financial policies under the assumption  of 
rational expectations. 
19.  Equations  (5) and  (7) are  substituted  into (3), and  (6) and  (8) are  substituted into (4). 
The resulting versions of  (3) and (4) are substituted into (I), and (9) is substituted for Y in  (I), 
(17). and (19). Equations  (5). (7). and  (15)  are substituted into (13). The modified version of 
(13) is used to eliminate  w from  (I  I).  The modified version of  (11) is employed to obtain an 
expression for p  which depends on e  when 0 < I* 5 1 but  is independent of  e when p.  = 0. 
This expression is substituted for p  wherever it appears in the modified versions of  (I),  (17), 
and  (19). The further modified versions of  (I), (17). and (19) with  the disturbances set equal 
to zero are subtracted from the same equations with the disturbances free to take on any value 
to obtain (20), (21), and (22). 369  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
crease in labor productivity  leaves nominal income unchanged and that with 
nominal  income unchanged  the markets for home money and home securi- 
ties are unaffected, so that ma = ba  = 0.20  Under these assumptions a shift 
in demand from the foreign good to the home good (a  > 0) and an increase 
in the productivity  of  labor can be analyzed together  because they  both af- 
fect only the market for the home good. Foreign  variables do not appear in 
(20), (21), and (22)  because they are fixed by the foreign authorities. 
Equilibrium  schedules for the markets for the home good, home money, 
and home securities are shown in figure  1 I.  1. The equilibrium schedule for 
the  home  good is X&,.  An  increase  in  i, which  lowers  demand, must be 
accompanied  by  a decline in L, which  raises excess demand. The equilib- 
rium schedule for home money is Ma,.  A rise in i, which reduces demand, 
must  be  offset  by  a  rise  in L, which  increases  demand.  The equilibrium 
schedule for home securities  is B&.  An  increase  i, which raises demand, 
must be matched  by  an increase  in L, which  lowers demand. The assump- 
tions of the model imply that the MM schedule is steeper than the BB sched- 
ule.  The  effect  of  an  increase  in  L  on  the  demand  for  home  money 
Fig. 11.1  Shift up  in excess demand for home goods 
20.  As stated in  n.  13, it is assumed that the demand for home nominal balances has a real 
income elasticity of unity.  Furthermore, it is assumed that p  and Y enter the demand for home 
securities only  because  home  wealth  minus home demand  for nominal  balances  is the  scale 
variable for home demand for these securities and that the disturbance term in  the production 
function  is  multiplicative.  These assumptions  imply that mp = b, = 0 as can be confirmed 
by  reference  to  the  explicit  expressions  for  the  relevant  approximation  coefficients  in  the 
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is  greater  than  the  absolute  value  of  the effect  of  an  increase in L  on the 
demand  for  home  securities:  mL > bL since  ml > b, and  m2 > b2.  The 
absolute  value  of  the  effect of  an  increase  in  i on the  demand  for  home 
money is smaller than the effect of an increase in  i on the demand for home 
securities: mi = m3 < b3 + b5 = b;. Because Xdr,,  M#o,  and B&  are 
the  equilibrium  schedules  that  would  result  if  all  disturbances  were  zero, 
they intersect at Lr.  Changes in the exchange rate or in the balance sheet of 
the  home  authorities  cause  the  schedules  to  shift  in  a  manner  described 
below. 
Now  consider the  employment  effects of  disturbances  to the  excess de- 
mand for the home good. Such disturbances might result from shifts in the 
allocation of  spending  between  home  and foreign  goods either  at  home or 
abroad  or  from  a  shift  up  in  the  productivity  of  home  labor.  Suppose  an 
increase  in the excess  demand  for the home  good  moves the XX schedule 
from XOX, to XlXl in figure  11.1. If the home authorities pursue an aggre- 
gates  constant  policy,  a  level  of  employment  between  Lf  and  L1 results. 
Employment tends to increase, creating an excess demand for home money 
and  an  excess  supply  of  home  securities.  Those  disequilibria  can only  be 
removed by a rise in the home interest rate and an appreciation of  the home 
currency. An appreciation of the home currency raises excess supply in the 
markets for the home good, home money, and home securities. As the home 
currency appreciates,  the X,X,,  M&fo,  and Bolpo schedules shift toward one 
another until  they  intersect at a point  in the  shaded triangle.  Under  an  ag- 
gregates  constant  policy,  disturbances  to  the  home  good  market  induce 
changes in the interest rate and the exchange rate that dampen the movement 
in employment. 
If instead the authorities pursue a rates constant policy, then following the 
increase in excess demand for the home good, the equilibrium point is point 
a, and the level of employment is L{  . Since there are no dampening changes 
in  the  interest  rate  or  the  exchange rate,  employment  raises  by  the  full 
amount  necessary  to reequilibrate  the  market  for the  home good. The au- 
thorities  must  undertake  both  monetary  operations  and  intervention  opera- 
tions in order to keep i and e fixed given the change in employment.  Expan- 
sionary  monetary  operations,  purchases  of  home  securities  with  home 
money, shift both  the MM  and BB  schedules to the  right.  A  monetary op- 
eration which shifts MM until it passes through point a also shifts BB farther 
to  the  right  because  mL > bL. Thus,  in  order to  ensure  that  BB  passes 
through point a, the authorities must undertake an intervention  operation, a 
sale of home  securities  in  exchange for foreign  securities.  When  the  only 
source of disturbances  to equilibrium is shifts in the excess demand for the 
home good, an aggregates constant policy leads to less variation  in employ- 
ment than a rates constant policy. 
A different conclusion  is reached when disturbances to financial markets 
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of disturbance for which intervention operations are the appropriate remedy, 
a shift in asset preferences between home and foreign securities. Suppose a 
shift  in  asset  preferences  away  from  home  securities and  toward  foreign 
securities moves the BB schedule from B&  to BIBl  in figure 11.2. Under 
an  aggregates constant policy  a level  of  employment between  L1 and  L2 
results. The decrease in demand for home securities leads to an increase in 
i, which in turn creates an excess supply of home money. In order for equi- 
librium  in  financial  markets  to  be  reestablished,  the  home currency  must 
depreciate.  The  new  equilibrium lies  in the shaded triangle.  Employment 
may rise,  fall, or remain the same since the changes in financial variables 
have opposite effects on demand for the home good. 
If  instead the authorities pursue a rates constant policy, they accommodate 
the shift in asset preferences with an intervention operation. The BB sched- 
ule  is  shifted from BIB,  back  to B&,  and employment definitely remains 
unchanged. When the only source of disturbances to equilibrium is shifts in 
asset preferences between home and foreign securities, a rates constant pol- 
icy leads to less variation in employment than an aggregates constant policy. 
Two other possible sources of  stochastic disturbances to equilibrium are 
(1)  shifts in home residents’ preferences between home money and foreign 
securities and (2)  shifts in home residents’ preferences between home money 
and  home  securities.  In  both  these cases,  a rates constant policy  leads to 
less variation in  employment than  an  aggregates constant policy.  Under  a 
rates constant policy the transmission of  financial market disturbances to the 
market for the home good through interest rate and exchange rate changes 
is prevented. 
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The results just described  can  be  summarized  more  formally.  The vari- 
ances of  home  employment  (at)  under rates  constant  (RC) and  aggregates 
constant (AC)  financial policy regimes are given by 
The two  sums C2  + C3 and mLC2 + bLC3  are clearly positive  if  ye > 0, 
since b, > m,,  and rnL > bL. It can be  shown that they  are positive  even if 
y, < 0.”  Thus, if  at  = u8 = u:  = 0 and  either  a:  or ui > 0, then 
ULLJAC < ULIRC.  If u,  = up = 0 and uy,  u8,  or a, > 0, then 0 = uLIR~  < 
UL/AC. 
Of  course, financial authorities operating under the assumptions about the 
availability and use of information specified above and attempting to choose 
among  alternative  financial  policies  would  probably  be  faced  with  all  the 
types  of  transitory  disturbances  considered  above. The analysis above pro- 
vides  only  limited  assistance.  For example,  given  the  coefficients  of  the 
model and all the other parameters  of  the joint distribution of disturbances, 
there exists a variance of the disturbance terms in the market  for the home 
good  large enough  to ensure that  an  aggregates constant  policy  leads to a 
lower expected  loss  than  a  rates  constant  policy.  Additional  conclusions 
must be based on explicit calculations of expected losses. A special assump- 
tion  yields  a  few  further  conclusions.  Suppose that  the  three  equilibrium 
conditions are normalized on employment and that the variances of the nor- 
malized disturbances are  An aggregates constant policy may or may 
not be better than a rates constant policy,  whereas under similar conditions 
in a closed economy a money supply constant policy  dominates an interest 
rate constant policy.  An  aggregates constant policy is superior (inferior) to 
a rates constant policy  for large values of  the degree of substitutability be- 
tween  home  and  foreign  securities  (the responsiveness  of  home  good  de- 
mand to changes in  the exchange rate). 
The financial  authorities would almost certainly have to deal with perma- 
nent as well as transitory  disturbance^.^^ The results regarding the effects of 
transitory disturbances  under alternative pure financial policy regimes carry 
over with minor modifications to the case in which a permanent disturbance 
21.  For proof of this assertion, see the Appendix. 
22.  That is, suppose equations (20), (211,  and (22) are divided through by  yL, mL, and  bL, 
respectively; that (a  + yppi/yL = p’, (y + 6)/mL = 6‘, and (-  y  +  E)/bL = E’  are distur- 
bances that may be mutually correlated; and that ui, = u:,  = uz,  c- 
23.  Meltzer (1978) has emphasized the importance of the distinction between permanent and 
transitory disturbances. 
2 
2  2  2  2  22  2  2 
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is  also pr~sent.’~  As  an  example  of  a  permanent  disturbance,  consider  a 
once-and-for-all  shift in demand  from the foreign good to the home  good. 
Of course, if private agents know that this disturbance has occurred and take 
it into account when setting the nominal wage, it has no effect on the aver- 
age levels of output and employment. Now  suppose that private agents do 
not  realize  immediately  that  this  permanent  disturbance  has  occurred.  It 
seems reasonable  to assume that the  nominal  wage would not be changed, 
at least for a while.  During this time the average real wage would be lower 
and  the average  level  of  employment  would be  higher than their full em- 
ployment  values under either an aggregates constant or a rates constant  fi- 
nancial policy regime.  However,  the deviation of average employment from 
its full employment level is smaller under an aggregates constant policy than 
under  a rates  constant  policy  because  induced  changes  in  the  interest  rate 
and the exchange rate dampen the movement in average employment.  After 
a while private  agents would recognize that levels of  output above the full 
employment value were being observed more frequently than would be sug- 
gested  by  what  was  known  about  the joint probability  distribution  of  the 
transitory  disturbances.  They would  conclude  that  the  economic  structure 
had  changed  and  would  change the  nominal  wage.  Important  research  on 
how private agents would go about trying to separate permanent from tran- 
sitory disturbances  under various  sets of  conditions is well under way, but 
it is not reported on here.25 
11.4 Transitory Disturbances and Alternative Pure Financial Policies 
in a Single Open Economy with Indexing 
Here  the  analysis  of  the  home  employment  effects  of  transitory  distur- 
bances under alternative pure financial policy regimes is extended to the case 
in which there is indexing in the home economy (0 >  G  1). The behavior 
of  the  home  and  foreign  financial  authorities  conforms  to  the  description 
provided in section  1 1.3. 
Allowing for indexing in the home country necessitates some changes in 
the compact form of the model of  equations (20), (21),  and (22).  The equi- 
librium  conditions  for the markets  for the  home  good, home  money, and 
home securities become26 
24.  Suppose  there  were  a  succession  of  permanent  shifts  in  asset  preferences  away from 
home securities and toward foreign securities. A rates constant policy would be appropriate but 
would require  a series of  sales of  foreign  securities by  the home authorities.  A rates constant 
policy would  still be  feasible  if  the authorities exhausted their holdings of  foreign  securities 
since the authorities could sell foreign currency forward. 
25. See, for example, Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980). 
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where 
YL = ypllp + yyxI. 
Ye = Ye -  Y~TP? 
Yp = yPp -  YYX,, 
AL  = mJlp + myxl, 
A, = me  + mpnp, 
2, = mpp - myx2, 
6,  = b,,llp + byxl, 
6,  = be - bpnp, 
6,  = bpp - byxZ. 
and 
?T  = k(1 - h),  p =  1/(1 - kh). 
A tilde over a coefficient indicates that the coefficient  has a different value 
with  indexing.  Though jL,  mL, and bL have the  same signs as yL, mL, and 
bL,  respectively,  they are larger in magnitude.  Each of these coefficients is 
the  sum of  the reinforcing  effects  on the  market  in question of  the  output 
and price rises induced by  a rise in L. With indexing a given  increase in  L 
must be accompanied by  a larger increase in p  because a given  increase in 
p  leads to a smaller decrease  in the real  wage. The coefficient  me has the 
same sign as the coefficient  m, and is larger; j, and  bP are smaller than ye 
and be and may  even be negative.  The coefficients jP,  &,,  and 6,  are each 
the sum of the direct effect of a rise in e and the indirect effect through the 
induced rise in p  on the market in question.  With  indexing,  increases in  e 
must  be  accompanied  by  increases  in p  if  L  is  to  remain  constant.  The 
indirect effects of a rise in  e may reinforce the direct effect, as in the case 
of  m,,  or counteract it, as in the cases of p,  and 6,.  Algebraically,  j,, mp, 
and 6,  are larger than y,, mp, and b,,  respectively.  The coefficient on p for 
each  market  is  the  result  of  subtracting  the  absolute  value  of  the  output 
effect of a positive  f3  from the absolute value of  the price effect.  With in- 
dexing a given positive  (3  induces a larger decrease in p.  Positive p's lower 
nominal  income  decreasing  the demand  for  home  money (- bp  < 0) and 
increasing the demand for home securities (6,  > 0). Thus, a shift in demand 
from the foreign good to the home good and an increase in labor productiv- 
ity can no longer be analyzed together. 
The results with indexing can be summarized formally.  The variances  of 
home employment  (6.2)  under rates constant and aggregates constant finan- 
cial policy regimes are given by 375  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
where 
= m,b, + b,me,  C3 = y,me - ma,, 
CZ = yibe  + bl)ie,  6,  = YLCj + mLC2  + bLC3. 
For what follows, it is useful to note that since b, > m, and mp > bp, 
and that since bLmp = mLbp  and mL > bL, 
C, = m,be + b,m, + np(b,mp - m,bp)  > 0 
~LCZ  + b~C3  = yl(mLbe + bLm,) + Ye(mLb, - bLm,) 
can be negative if ye is negative and the second term on the right-hand side 
of  the equals sign  is large enough  in  absolute  value to outweigh  the  first. 
Only if  A, > 0 do all the disturbances  have their usual comparative  static 
effects.  It is assumed that 6,  > 0 even if mLC2 + bLC3  < 0. 
It  is  convenient  to discuss  the  results  for  financial  market  disturbances 
first. Indexing does not change the conclusion that when the only sources of 
disturbances  to equilibrium  are shifts in  asset preferences,  a rates constant 
policy  leads  to less  variation  in  employment  than  an  aggregates  constant 
policy because  it prevents the transmission  of  financial disturbances to the 
market for the home good through interest rate and exchange rate changes. 
If  IS,  = u’p  = 0 and u;,  vi, or  > 0, then 0 = eLIRC  < 6&.  The more 
difficult question of whether indexing increases or reduces the advantage of 
a rates constant policy is not addressed here. 
Indexing necessitates a minor qualification to the result obtained in section 
1 1.3 for a shift in demand from the foreign good to the home good. For this 
disturbance an aggregates constant policy still leads to less variation  in em- 
ployment than a rates constant policy unless the effect of a change in wealth 
on the  demand  for the  home  good  is too large. The greater the degree of 
indexing  (the  larger  p  and, therefore,  np), the  larger  the  increase  in  the 
price of the domestic good induced by a depreciation of the home currency 
and the smaller the increase in the relative  price of the foreign good  (e - 
p). The smaller  the  increase  in  the relative  price of  the  foreign  good, the 
lower the algebraic value of  the increase in the demand for the home good 
associated with a depreciation of  the home currency: 
2  2 
What  is  critical  for determining  whether  a  positive  k  and  the  associated 
lower Ye can lead to a reversal of the result that an aggregates constant policy 
dominates is the size of the effect of  a change in wealth on demand for the 
home good.27  If  this wealth effect is negligible (ys,  y6 +  O), then no matter 
what the degree of indexing (0 < k, np  5  1) an aggregates constant policy 
continues to dominate since mLC2 + &c3  remains positive. However,  if the 
pendix. 
27.  For proof of  this  assertion and the others in the  remainder of  this  section, see the  Ap- 376  Dale W. Henderson 
wealth  effect  is not  negligible  (y6 > ys > o), then  a rates constant policy 
may dominate since mLC2 + bLC3  may be negative. For example, if  index- 
ing is complete, then when there is an intermediate degree of substitutability 
between  home and  foreign  securities  an  aggregates  constant  policy  domi- 
nates  for small  enough  positive  values  of  y6  and y,,  but  when  home  and 
foreign securities are highly  substitutable,  a rates constant policy is as good 
as  an  aggregates  constant  policy  for  ys = y6  = 0, and  a rates  constant 
policy dominates for all y6 > y5 > 0. 
The introduction  of  indexing  complicates  the  comparison  of  aggregates 
constant and rates constant policies in the case of labor productivity distur- 
bances.  With indexing  these  disturbances  directly affect all three  markets. 
Thus, for labor productivity  disturbances  a rates  constant  policy  might  be 
preferred  even if  an aggregates constant policy  would be preferred for dis- 
turbances that directly affect only the market for the home good. 
11.5  Transitory Disturbances and Contemporaneous Financial Policy 
Feedback Rules in a Single Open Economy with No Indexing 
In this section it is assumed that the financial authorities can observe cur- 
rent  movements  in financial variables not chosen as policy  instruments and 
respond  to them  in  attempting  to  dampen  the  effects  of  transitory  distur- 
bances.  Furthermore,  it  is assumed  that  the  authorities  change  a  financial 
policy instrument in response to current information  while the nominal wage 
remains fixed at a value set before other markets meet. That the authorities 
rather than  private agents should adjust  to current  information  even if  it is 
available to both  sets of agents seems reasonable since the costs associated 
with changing a financial policy instrument are much smaller than the costs 
associated  with  renegotiating  the nominal  wage.28 Others have  shown that 
in  such  an  environment  contemporaneous  financial  policy  feedback  rules 
usually  dominate  pure  financial  policies  of  the type  considered  in the  last 
two sections.29 Here it is demonstrated that a contemporaneous intervention 
28.  It could be assumed that the nominal wage was “indexed”  to the financial variables not 
chosen as policy instruments and that financial policy instruments were not changed.  If  such an 
indexing rule were determined optimally, it would result in  the same variation in  employment 
as would the authorities’  optimal feedback rule as shown in the context of  a closed economy 
model by  Canzoneri, Henderson, and  Rogoff (1983). It appears that  labor contracts involving 
indexing to financial variables  are  not  negotiated,  and conventional  indexing is  not  a perfect 
substitute for this type of indexing. 
29.  The  superiority  of  contemporaneous  feedback  rules  was  first  demonstrated  by  Poole 
(1970). Kareken,  Muench, and Wallace  (1973)  and  Friedman  (1975) significantly generalize 
and extend Poole’s results. Boyer (1978) derives a contemporaneous feedback rule in a model 
in which home and foreign securities are perfect substitutes and exchange rate expectations are 
static. Roper and Turnovsky  (1980)  show how this rule is affected by  the incorporation of  a 
more  general  hypothesis  regarding  the formation  of  exchange rate expectations  and  an  addi- 
tional type of disturbance.  Boyer (1980) considers feedback rules for the authorities in a model 
which is the same as the one used  here  in all essential  respects except that expectations  are 
static. Fischer’s (1977) and Frcnkel’s (1980) optimal rules are derived in models quite different 
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policy feedback rule is usually  superior to either fixed or flexible exchange 
rates. This rule may imply reinforcing rather than dampening the movement 
in the exchange rate that would occur if there were no intervention. 
As  before,  the  financial  authorities  seek  to mitigate  the  fluctuations  in 
unobserved  employment caused by different disturbances.  The interest  rate 
and the  exogenous supply  of  home  (currency)  assets  are chosen  as policy 
instruments; the interest rate is kept rigidly  fixed at an arbitrary value,  and 
the  exogenous supply of  home assets  is varied through  intervention  opera- 
tions  in  response  to  the  current  information  conveyed  by  exchange  rate 
movements.  Under  these  assumptions, the  model  of  equations  (20), (21), 
and (22) can be rewritten as 
(30)  0  =  -yJ  + ypP  + a + ypp, 
(31)  B'  =  b$  + b:P  +ti+€. 
Equation (31) is obtained by  summing equations (21) and (22). The change 
in the exogenous supply of all home assets, B'  = B  + A,  represents inter- 
vention operations since monetary operations leave the exogenous supply of 
home assets unchanged.  Definitions of y,  and ye are provided  above, and 
bf = m, -  bL, and b:  = me + b,. 
Equilibrium schedules for the markets for the home good and home assets are 
shown in figure 1 1.3.  The equilibrium schedule for the home good is Xdr,. An 
increase in e,  which raises demand, must be accompanied by an increase in L, 
Fig. 11.3 
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which  lowers excess demand. The equilibrium  schedule for home assets is 
B&.  A rise in e,  which increases demand, must be offset by a fall in L,  which 
reduces demand. The contemporaneous intervention policy feedback rule alters 
the slope of the B'B'  schedule in  a manner described below. 
Since the  authorities  observe  the  movement  in  the  exchange  rate,  they 
observe a linear combination of  the disturbances. To see this, solve (30) for 
i,  subsititute the result into (31), and rearrange to obtain 
(32) 
(33) 
i = (Y,/YL)&  + (I/YL)(U + YpP) = (YP/YL)$  + 8, 
B' - (bh,/yL + b;)$ = b;e  + 6 + E = 4. 
The authorities  can observe the  linear  combination  of  disturbances  repre- 
sented by  4 because they know or can observe everything to the left of the 
first equals sign in (33). 
The authorities  minimize the variance of  employment  by  acting so as to 
make  the  expectation  of  the  employment  deviation  conditioned  on  4, 
@I+),  equal to zero: 
(34) 
where E(O(+) is the expectation of 0 conditional on 4, and  'O 
E(&)  = 0 = (YP/YL.)P + E(Ol44, 
(35)  E(OI4) = [COV(O,  +)/var(+)l43 
cov(e, $1  = b;~:, 
var(+) = bt2ui + u:  + ui, 
(To  2 = (l/yL)z(u:  + y;u'P,. 
Setting the conditional expectation of  equal to zero implies an interven- 
tion rule for the authorities.  Substituting the left-hand side of  (33) for I$  in 
(33, substituting (35) into (34), and solving for B'  yields this rule: 
(36)  B'  = J?e, 
J?  = b:  - LYJOIL~L)I[(~  + &dl. 
If  the  authorities follow this rule, the equilibrium condition  for the  market 
for home assets (31) becomes 
(37)  0 = b;i  + (b; - *)&  + 6  + E. 
In general, the authorities should neither fix the exchange rate nor allow 
it  to  fluctuate  freely.  Only  if  disturbances  in  the  market  for  home  assets 
predominate  [(a;  + uf)/ai  +  MI  should they fix the exchange rate (choose 
an indefinitely large negative value for $ so that the B'B' schedule becomes 
horizontal).  By  fixing  the  exchange rate  they  prevent  any transmission  of 
30.  In this section it assumed that the disturbances are normally distributed. 379  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
purely financial disturbances to the market for the home good. When distur- 
bances to the market for the home good predominate [(a;  + u:)/ai  +  01, 
the authorities should not simply allow the exchange rate to fluctuate freely 
(choose a value of zero for J, so that the BIB'  schedule remains unaffected). 
Rather,  they should reinforce any tendency for the home currency to depre- 
ciate by  selling home assets.  By  making the market for home  assets com- 
pletely  insensitive to exchange rate movements (choosing a value of b:  for 
J, so that the BIB' schedule becomes vertical), thereby amplifying exchange 
rate movements that would occur in the absence of intervention, the author- 
ities generate  exchange rate movements that completely offset disturbances 
to the market for the home good. 
The intervention rule just derived is not the truly  optimal contemporane- 
ous financial  policy  feedback  rule  except  in  the  extreme  cases  in  which 
(a;  + a$)/ui  approaches  infinity  or zero.  The shortcoming  of this  rule  is 
that it does not reflect the  information about 8 embodied in the changes in 
the money supply required to keep the interest rate fixed. The truly optimal 
intervention policy rule requires intervention to be a linear function of both 
exchange rate changes and money supply changes. However, few additional 
qualitative  insights can be gained  from  the considerably  more complicated 
optimal rule. 
Even under the optimal financial policy, one policy instrument, the inter- 
est  rate  in  the  example considered  above, can be  kept  rigidly  fixed.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  authorities  have  only  a  single objective,  minimizing  the 
variance of employment, and that the  coefficients  of the model  are known 
with  certainty.  Therefore  the  authorities need  vary  only one policy  instru- 
ment,  the exogenous  supply of  home assets,  to do as well  as they  can. If 
either  of  these  assumptions  were  relaxed, optimal  financial  policy  would 
involve variations in both policy instruments as well as in both information 
 variable^.^'  Thus, in general,  it  is optimal for an individual country to opt 
for  managed  floating  rather  than  a  fixed or freely  floating  exchange  rate 
whether  the  exchange rate  is chosen  as a policy  instrument or  used  as an 
information variable. 
11.6 The Exchange Rate and the Interest Rate as 
Information Variables 
For many years the search for a way to extract information from financial 
data about the likely realizations of unobserved  target variables was a quest 
31, Brainard (1967) shows that if the coefficients of  the model are stochastic variables which 
have a joint distribution with the additive disturbances that is known to the authorities, then in 
general an optimal financial policy requires that all financial variables chosen as policy instru- 
ments be set at well-defined values even if  the authorities seek to minimize the squared devia- 
tions of only a single target variable from its target value.  If they operated in this environment, 
the authorities would have to make inferences about the coefficients of  the model as well as 
about the additive disturbances. 380  Dale W. Henderson 
for the best  single indicator  of  the stance  of  monetary  policy.  In  section 
11.5, the current view that more information can be obtained if  movements 
in  a number of  financial variables  are analyzed  simultaneously  is stated in 
broad terms.  Here there is a more explicit discussion of how the authorities 
can  use  exchange rate  movements in  conjunction  with  interest  rate  move- 
ments to reduce but not eliminate their uncertainty  about the source of  dis- 
turbances to the economy. It is assumed that the monetary authorities choose 
the money  supply and the supply of  home  securities as their policy  instru- 
ments and set them  for some interval of  time before  changing  them  in  re- 
sponse to their inferences about the likely movement in unobserved employ- 
ment. The tool of analysis is the version of the model used in section  11.3. 
Some results  have already  been  obtained. In  section  11.3 it  was argued 
that a shift up in excess demand for the home good depicted in figure  1 1.1 
leads to an increase  in  the interest  rate, an appreciation  of  the  home cur- 
rency,  and a rise in unobserved  employment. A  shift up in  excess demand 
for the home good  can  be  distinguished  from a  shift  in  asset  preferences 
away  from home  securities  and toward  foreign  securities  on  the  basis  of 
movements  in financial variables. In the case of  a shift in asset preferences 
represented  in figure  11.2, the interest rate rises but the home currency de- 
preciates.  As  stated above, the effect of  this disturbance on unobserved em- 
ployment is ambiguous in general. However, this effect is likely to be pos- 
itive.  If, as seems probable, the responsiveness  of  home money demand to 
the  foreign  interest  rate  adjusted  for  exchange  rate  expectations  (m4)  is 
small, then with employment held constant a depreciation of  the home cur- 
rency clears the financial markets with little change in the interest rate. The 
interest  rate  rises  primarily  because  the  employment increase  generated  by 
the depreciation  raises money demand. Since both of the disturbances prob- 
ably lead to increases in unobserved  employment, the importance  of  being 
able to  distinguish  between  them  arises  because  the  appropriate  responses 
are different. In the case of a shift up in excess demand for the home good, 
the authorities would probably  want to both reduce the home money supply 
and intervene to cause an appreciation  of the home currency. In the case of 
a shift in asset preferences  away from home securities, the authorities would 
probably want simply to intervene to prevent the home currency from depre- 
ciating. 
Now consider a shift up in money demand at the expense of the demand 
for home securities. As  shown in  figure  11.4, this  disturbance  shifts both 
the  MM  and  BB  schedules up,  from MOMo  to MlMl and  BOBo  to BIBI, 
respectively;  the MM schedule shifts farther  up because mi  < bi.  If MlMl 
and BIBl  intersect  below Xd,, as in figure  11.4, then the new equilibrium 
is in the shaded area. The interest rate rises; the home currency appreciates, 
and unobserved  employment falls. If MlMl  and BIBl  intersect above Xd0, 
the only difference is that the home currency depreciates. The case in which 
the  home currency appreciates is  probably  more  relevant. The home  cur- 381  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
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Fig. 11.4  Shift into home money out of  home securities 
rency is more likely to appreciate the more similar in absolute value are the 
employment responsivenesses of  the demands for  home  money  and  home 
securities, and the better substitutes are home and foreign securities.32 Thus, 
exchange rate  movements probably  make it no easier for the authorities  to 
distinguish between two important sources of disturbances, shifts in excess 
demand for the  home good  and  shifts  in  money  demand,  to  which  they 
would want to respond very differently. 
There is  a presumption  that  exchange rate  movements can  help the  au- 
thorities  separate shifts in  money  demand from changes in  expected  infla- 
tion. Just how to model an increase in expected inflation is not immediately 
obvious.  The experiment conducted  here  is  perhaps  the  simplest, though 
clearly  not  the  most realistic.  It  is assumed  that, after nominal  wages  are 
set, private  agents raise their estimates  of  next period’s  price level  @)  and 
next period’s  exchange rate (Z)  by the same proportion ($ = i)  and foresee 
that the price  level and the exchange rate will remain  at these new, higher 
values forever. Such a revision of expectations would be warranted if private 
agents came to believe that there would be a one-time “helicopter drop” of 
home money and home securities next period that wpuld increase the stocks 
of these assets by the same proportion ($ = 2 = MIM = B/B). As  shown 
in figure 1 1.5, this kind of  increase in expected inflation (with the associated 
increase in the rate of expected depreciation of  the home currency) leads to 
an increase  in the demand for the home good, which shifts the XX schedule 
from X&,  to X,X,, and to decreases in the demands for home money  and 
__ 
32.  For  proof of this assertion, see the Appendix 382  Dale W. Henderson 
Fig. 11.5  Increase in expected inflation 
home  securities, which  shift  the MM schedule from M&lo  to  MlMl and 
the  BB  schedule  from  B&io  to  BIB1,  respectively.  The  XX  schedule 
shifts up  farther than  the BB schedule, and XlXl and BIBl  intersect above 
M~MI.~~  If  M1Ml  and XlXl intersect  above I,  as  in  figure  11.5, then  the 
new  equilibrium is  in  the  shaded area. The interest  rate  rises,  the  home 
currency  depreciates,  and  unobserved  employment  rises.  If  MlMl and 
XlXl intersect  below  i, the  only  difference is  that  the  interest  rate  may 
fall instead of  rising.  The case in  which  the  interest rate rises  is probably 
more  relevant.  The  interest  rate  is  more  likely  to  rise  the  smaller  the 
responsiveness  of home money  demand to the foreign interest rate adjusted 
for  exchange rate expectations (rn4)-that  is, the  smaller  the  reduction  in 
money demand resulting from the disturbance-and  the better substitutes are 
home and foreign  securities. Thus, the presumption  is that shifts  in money 
demand need not be mistaken for revisions in inflation expectations. Distur- 
bances of the two types that have the same implications for the interest rate 
have different implications for the exchange rate. This presumption may turn 
out  to  be  particularly  helpful  in  the  current  policymaking  environment. 
Changes in the financial structure have made pinning down money  demand 
more problematic. At the same time, the authorities  have undertaken  poli- 
cies explicitly  designed to cause private  agents to lower  their estimate  of 
expected inflation. 
33. Given that  = f),  (;&  =  1, (i/;)BB  = (b4 + h5)l(b3  + b,) <  1  since h3 > bq. 
XjX,  and B,B, intersect  above MIMI  since the home currency  depreciates. For  proof  of  the 
assertions in this note and those in the accompanying paragraph in the text, see the Appendix. 383  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
11.7  Vicious Circles and Intervention Policy 
It  is often  argued  that  more  flexibility  in  exchange  rates  has  led to the 
development  of  so-called vicious  (and virtuous) circles.34 There is no gen- 
erally  accepted  benchmark  for use in  isolating  phenomena  which  are to be 
designated as vicious circles. All that is really clear is that those concerned 
about vicious circles have in mind  a positive association between deprecia- 
tions  of  a  country’s  currency  and  increases  in  measures  of  that  country’s 
price level. 
The response has been that increased exchange rate flexibility is not really 
the root cause of vicious circles.  Skeptics point out that a country’s mone- 
tary authorities can cause both a depreciation of their country’s currency and 
an increase in its price indices by  initiating an expansion of their country’s 
money  supply. Furthermore, these  skeptics argue, exogenous  disturbances 
cannot lead to depreciations  and price index increases unless monetary pol- 
icy  is accommodating.  Thus, the monetary  authorities either directly cause 
vicious circles or allow them to occur. 
There is  much  to agree with  in  the  skeptical  view.  However,  in  some 
policymaking  environments  with plausible  features,  allowing the exchange 
rate to fluctuate rather than keeping it fixed with intervention operations can 
change the set of outcomes attainable by the financial authorities in a way 
that they might legitimately regard  as unfavorable.  The example of  such an 
environment discussed  here has two key  features: (1) the nominal  wage is 
partially  indexed,  and  (2)  intervention  operations  can affect  the  exchange 
rate. 
The objective of the financial authorities is assumed to be the stabilization 
of  employment as before.  However, in  this  section  it  is assumed  that  the 
financial authorities obtain complete information about the disturbances that 
occur in  any period  and can respond  to this  information within  the period. 
Given the types of disturbances  included in the model of  section  11.2, sta- 
bilizing  employment implies keeping the change in the real wage measured 
in terms of home output (Kj -  @)  equal to the productivity disturbance (p). 
Given  the  objective *of*the ho*me  financial  authorities  and  that  the  foreign 
authorities stabilize p,  Y,  and i, the model of section  11.2 can be rewritten 
in  the following compact form:35 
(38)  0 =  -y@  - y,z +  y,P  + a + ypp, 
(39)  A=  rn@  -  mi;  + rn,e  +r+& 
34.  The analysis of  this section is based on Henderson (1980) which,  in turn, was inspired 
by Wallich and Gray (1981). 
35.  The  substitutions  used  to  obtain  equations  (38)-(41)  are  similar  to  the  ones used  to 
obtain equations (20)-(22)  following the procedure of  n.  19. However, the expression forp is 
retained as equation  (41)-  rather than being used  to eliminate p from the modified versions of 
(I), (17). and (19), and L is set equal to zero wherever it appears. 384  Dale W. Henderson 
+ ITpP  -  PP.  0= -  p  (41  1 
Of  course, under both  fixed  and  flexible exchange rates, a  shift out of 
money into home securities (y < 0) can be offset with a contractionary open 
market operation (&? =  -B < 0) with no change in any other endogenous 
variable. 
Now  consider a  shift down in the demand for the  home  good  (a  < 0). 
Suppose the nominal  interest rate is lowered by enough to reequilibrate the 
market for the home good through an increase in the money supply accom- 
plished  by  an expansionary open market  operation  (&? =  -B  > 0).  The 
open  market  operation which  clears the  home  moliey  market  at  the  new 
lower nominal interest  rate  results  in  an  excess supply of  home  securities 
since the decline in the  nominal  interest rate  lowers the demand for home 
securities  by  more than  it raises the demand for home  money. The excess 
supply of  home securities gives rise to a tendency for the home currency to 
depreciate. Under fixed exchange rates, the financial authorities react to the 
pressure on the exchange rate with an intervention operation, a sale of  for- 
eign securities matched  by  a purchase of  home securities (8 < 0,  &?  = 0), 
so that the exchange rate, and therefore the price of the home good and the 
price index, remain unchanged. However, under flexible exchange rates, the 
financial authorities  allow the home currency to depreciate  (e to rise).  This 
depreciation leads to an increase in the price index and the partially  indexed 
nominal  wage.  In  order for the  real  wage to remain  constant  (as  it  must 
since  P  = 0), the price of  home output  must rise, but the increase in p  is 
less than the rise in e because indexation is only partial.  Since both the price 
of  the home good @) the relative price of the foreign good (e -  p)  rise, the 
nominal interest rate decline needed to reequilibrate the market for the home 
good may be larger or smaller under floating exchange rates.36 
36.  If indexing were complete (p =  I), the relative price of the foreign good would remain 
unchanged and  i  would definitely decline by  more under flexible exchange rates. In this case, 
the real wage measured in terms of  the consumption basket  as well as the real wage measured 
in  terms of home  output would remain unchanged.  The direct effect of  a decline in i  on the 
demand for home output is to raise this demand. However, there are also some induced effects. 
If i falls, e rises, p  increases, and M =  -B increases. These changes must take place in order 
to satisfy (39). (40),  and (41). The rise in e raises the demand for home output, but the increase 
in p  lowers this demand. Throughout this section, it is assumed that the net result of  the direct 
and  induced  effects of  a decline  in  i  on the  demand  for home output  is  an  increase in  this 
demand. More formally, it is assumed that 
Y, > -j,[(b, - m,)Kfi,  + be)], 
where je,  me,  and  b,  are defined  below equation (27). This condition is always met  if  j, 3 
-yl,  since it can be  shown that the expression in square brackets is positive and less than one. 
In section  1 1.4 it is shown that je  2 -  y, for all y,,  y,  > 0 if the indexing parameter is small 
(p +  0)  and that jc  2 - y, for all 0 < p.  5 1 if  the effect of  wealth on aggregate demand is 
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Next  consider  a  shift down  in  the  productivity  of  labor  (p < 0). It  is 
useful to begin the analysis of this disturbance by noting that if the exchange 
rate  were  fixed, p  would  have to rise  in  order to  lower the real  wage  by 
enough to match the drop in p. Suppose this rise in p  occurs. It adds to the 
excess supply of the home good caused by the direct effect of the decline in 
p on the market for the home good. Further,  suppose that the nominal  in- 
terest  rate  is  lowered  by  enough  to reequilibrate  the  market for the  home 
good. To accommodate the rise in p  and the decline in i hypothesized above, 
the authorities must  increase the money  supply with an expansionary open 
market operation.  The open market operation which clears the home money 
market at the higher p  and  lower  i may result in either an excess supply or 
excess demand for home securities.  The decline in  i lowers the demand for 
home securities by more than it raises the demand for home money, but the 
rise  in p  lowers  the  demand  for home  securities by  less than  it raises  the 
demand for home money. Thus, under fixed exchange rates, the authorities 
may  be  required  either  to purchase  or to sell home  securities in exchange 
for foreign securities to stabilize the exchange rate,  thereby  preventing any 
further  movement  in p  and  the  price  index.  It  follows  that  under  flexible 
exchange rates the  home currency  may  either depreciate  or appreciate and 
the initial  increase in p  and y may  be  amplified  or dampened according to 
the logic employed above in the analysis of  a shift in demand for the home 
good. 
A similar line of argument can be used to establish that for a shift out of 
home money into foreign securities (6 < 0) or a shift out of home securities 
into foreign securities  (E  < 0), stabilizing employment  leads to no change 
in  e, p, q, or i  under fixed exchange rates.  Under flexible exchange rates, 
both disturbances lead to a depreciation of the home currency and increases 
in p  and  y. Whether  i increases  or decreases  depends  on  whether  the  in- 
creases in p  and e -  p  which  satisfy the condition that the real wage must 
remain constant, equation (41), lead to an excess demand for, or supply of, 
the home good. 
These results have implications for the trade-off  between  output variabil- 
ity and price level  (home good price and price index) variability  under the 
two alternative exchange rate regimes.  In order to achieve the same amount 
of output variability under both  exchange rate regimes,  the  authorities will 
have to accept more price variability  under floating exchange rates,  except 
perhaps in the case of disturbances in labor productivity. This change in the 
authorities’ trade-off between output and price variability  might legitimately 
be regarded  as unfavorable  and is suggestive of the concerns of those who 
emphasize  the  importance  of  vicious  circles. However,  further  analysis  is 
necessary before firm  conclusions can be drawn about the importance of the 
results derived above. It is important to establish a basis for the authorities’ 
concern  about  price  level  variability  and  to  study  the  effects  of  possible 386  Dale W. Henderson 
responsiveness  of  the indexing parameter  to changes in  exchange rate  re- 
gime.37 
11.8 Transitory Disturbances and the Scope for Agreement on 
Intervention Policy in a Two-Country World Economy with No 
Indexing 
In  this  section  it  is  assumed  that  neither  the home  authorities  nor  the 
foreign authorities observe the current values of their country’s output, em- 
ployment, or the price of  their country’s good. As a result, transitory distur- 
bances such as those considered  above affect employment in both countries 
of  the two-country  world  economy. For simplicity, it  is also assumed  that 
the  authorities  in  each country use  monetary  operations  to fix  the  interest 
rate on securities denominated in the currency of  their country. The overall 
stance of  intervention  policy  is the net result of  the intervention operations 
of  the two sets of  authorities. Taken together,  they can choose as a policy 
instrument  and set a value for either the  exogenous supply  of  home  assets 
(and,  by  implication, the exogenous supply  of  foreign  assets) or  the  ex- 
change rate.  In  this  environment it  is  interesting  to  consider  whether  the 
authorities in the two countries could agree on a fixed or a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate.38 
Under  the  assumptions of  this  section the relevant  version of  the  model 
of  section  1 I .2 written in compact form is39 
I* 
(43)  B’  =  bli + b:C  - btL  +6+€, 
*^ *  **^  (44)  0  =  YLL -  y,c  - ytL - a. 
Definitions of yL,  ye, B‘, bt, and b:  are provided above, and 
37.  Flood and Marion (1982) assume that agents choose the indexing parameter in  order to 
maximize expected utility and find that the optimal indexing parameter is different under alter- 
native exchange rate regimes. 
38.  Sweeney (1976) and Canzoneri (1982) analyze open economy financial policy using two- 
country models. 
39.  Equations  (5)  and (7) are  substituted into (3), and  (6)  and  (8) are substituted into (4). 
The resulting versions*of  (3) and (4) are substituted into (I) and (2). Equations (9) and (10) are 
substituted for Y and Y  in (l), (2), (17), and (19). Equations (5),  (7), and (15) are substituted 
into (13), and equations (6),  (8), and (16) are substituted into (14). The modified versions of 
(13) and (14) are used to eliminate w and & from (I  1) and (12). The modified versions of  (1 I) 
and (12) are employed to obtain expressions for p  and ?,  which are independent of  e under the 
assumption that p = $ = 0. These expressions are substituted forp  and $ wherever they appear in 
(l), (2), (17), and  (19). The modified versions of  (I) and (2) and  the sum of  (17) and (19) 
with the disturbances set equal to zero are subtracted from the same equations with the distrurb- 
ances free to take on any value to obtain (42), (43), and (44). 387  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
**  * 
y2  = & + y;&  YL = Ypll + YYXl. 
Yt = Y$I  + Y;xl, 
*  ******  bi = bt = b;ll + b;xl,  ye = y,: -  y3 - y6 + y,, 
*  **  ** 
and 
b;  = bs, 
b;  = bg, 
Y;  = Y4 -  012 + Y3)(1 -  h),  Y; = YI, 
**  ** 
$&!I  = Y4 -  (Y2 + Y3P? 
;; = Y4  + ($* + ;3)u  - h) + $6,  ;;  = s + YI. 
YY = YIP 
It is assumed  that income, relative price, and wealth effects outweigh pos- 
sibly perverse expected real interest rate effects so that yi.  $e,  and $,  are all 
positive.  In order to simplify the analysis further,  it @ ayumed that,the tw,o 
countries are “symmetric”  in the  sense that y,  = y;,  y, = y;, b,  = bi, 
and ye = ye. 
Equilibrium schedules for the  markets  for the  home  good,  the  foreign 
good, and home assets are shown in figure 11.6. The equilibrium  schedule 
for the  home  good is  X&o.  An  inc5ease  in  L, which  reduces  excess de- 
mand, must be matched by  a rise in L,  F2ch  increases demand. The equi- 
librium schedule for the foreign good is Xa0.  An increase in L, which raises 
*  40 
L,  Ll  L2 
Fig. 11.6  Disturbances in a two-country world economy 
40.  In  Henderson  (1982)  all  these  assumptions except  the  one  that  ye  =  Fe  are  relaxed 
Although the analysis is more complicated, the results are basically the same. 388  Dale W. Henderson 
* 
demand, must  be  matched  by  a  rise  in L, which  reduces  excess demand. 
Under the symmetry assumption the slope of  the XX schedule is greater than 
positive one, and the slope of the XX schedule is the reciprocal of the slope 
of the XX schedule:  ** 
The restriciions  on the parameters  of  equations (42), (43), and  (44) imply 
that yL > yL;  the absolute value of  the reduction  in excess demand for the 
home good caused by  a rise  in L  which  increases  home saving as well  as 
home imports exceeds the increase  in excess demand  for the foreign  good 
caused by  a rise  in L  which  increases  not  only  foreign  exports (home* im- 
ports) but also foreign saving. The symmetry assumption  implies that yL = 
yt. The equilibrium schedule for the market  for  home  assets  is BSb. An 
increase in L, which raises the deTand for home money plus home  securi- 
ties,  must  be  offset  by  a rise  in  L, which  raises  the  demand for foreign 
money  partly  at the expense of  the demand for home  securities.  Under the 
symmetry assumption, the slope oifhe B'B'  schedule is  + 1. Therefore, the 
B'B' schedule is steeper than the XX schedule. 
It is useful to consider first the effects of  a shift up in the demand for the 
home  good matched  by  a  shift  down  in  the  demand for the  foreign  good 
which  is  equal  in  absolute  value  (a  >,,O).  Such  a  shift  can  be  rep- 
resented  by  movements in  the  XX and  XX  schedules  from  X&,  to XlXl 
and  from Xdr, to X,X,, respectively. At  a constant  value  of  L, XX shifts 
farther to  the right  than XX (aoa, > uoa2)  since y,  > $L as argued  above. 
Similarly, at a constant value of L, XX shifts down farther than XX (aoa3 > 
uouJ  since $:,  >  yf from the symmetry assumption. A seriy oidemand shifts 
of  the type  under  consideration  would  trace  out  the  XX&Xo  schedule  in 
figure 11.6. 
As an intermediate step, consider the effect of a depreciation of  the home 
currency. Under the  symmetry  assumption  this  depreciation  raises  demand 
for the home good and lowers demand for the foreign good by amounts that 
are equal in absolute value. Thus depreciations  (appreciations) move the XX 
and  XX schedules  down  (up)  so  that  they  continue  to  intersect  on  the 
XX&Xo  schedule. 
Now the analysis of a shift in demand to the p*me good from the foreign 
good can  be  completed.  The shifted  XX and  XX schedules  are XlXI  and 
XIXI.  Under  fixed  rates  the equilibrium is at point  a5.  The shift in prefer- 
ences for goods causes home employment to rise  and foreign employment 
to fall. Both of  these  movements tend  to raise demand for home  currency 
assets, SO  the home currency tends  to appreciate.  However, the authorities 
undertake intervention  operations, sales  of  home securities  for foreign  se- 
curities which shift the BIB'  schedule down. The new B'B'  schedule labeled 
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B;B; passes  through u5. Under  flexible  exchange  rates the  home currency 
appreciates,  dampening the rise in home employment and the fall in foreign 
employment.  The  B'B'  schedule  shifts  down  and  the  XX  and  XX 
schedules shift up along XXdar, until an equilibrium is reached somewhere 
on the line segment  above u5.  Thus, for shifts in demand between home 
and  foreign  goods there  is less  variation  in both  home  and  foreign output 
under floating exchange rates, and there is no policy conflict. 
Next, consider a shift in asset preferences toward home assets and away 
from foreign assets. For convenience, suppose that the initial equilibrium is 
at u5.  The change in asset preferences shifts the B'B'  schedule from B;B;  to 
BhB& Under fixed exchange rates the new equilibrium is at us,  which is also 
the  initial  equilibrium. The shift  in  asset  preferences  puts  pressure  on  the 
home  currency  to appreciate.  Under  fixed  exchange rates  this  pressure  is 
met  by  intervention  operations,  sales  of  home  securities  in  exchange for 
foreign  securities,  which  shift the B'B'  schedule from BhBA  back  to B;B;. 
Under  flexible  exchange  rates  the  home  currency  appreciates,  lowering 
home  employment  and  raising  foreign  employment.  The  B'B'  schedule 
shifts down and XX and XX shift up along XXdrx,  until  a new equilibrium 
is reached  along the  line  segment  uous above  u5. Thus, for shifts in  asset 
preferences  between home and foreign assets there is less variation in both 
home  and foreign employment  under fixed exchange rates,  and once again 
there is no policy conflict. 
Finally,  consider an  increase  in  the  productivity  of  labor  in  the  home 
country. Suppose the original equilibrium is at uo. This disturbance initially 
affects  only  the  XX schedule,  which  is shifted  from Xdr, to XIXI.  Under 
fixed exchange rates the new equilibrium  is at a6. Home employment rises 
and, as a result of induced home demand for foreign goods, foreign employ- 
ment rises.  Since the B'B'  schedule  is steeper than the XX schedule,  there 
is pressure on the home currency to appreciate.  Under fixed exchange rates 
this pressure is countered with intervention operations which cause the B'B' 
schedule to shift down from B&  until  it  passes through a6. Under flexible 
exchange rates the home currency appreciates,  dampening the rise in home 
employment but amplifying the rise in foreign employment. The BIB'  sched- 
ule  shifts down, tnd*the XX and  XX  schedules  shift  up  along  the  new 
XXXX schedule XXIXXl until  a new equilibrium  is reached on the line seg- 
ment  a746 above u6. Thus,  for  shifts  in  home  labor  productivity  there  is 
more  variation  in  home employment under fixed exchange  rates  and more 
variation in foreign employment under flexible exchange rates,  and there is 
a definite policy conflict. 
The results just described  can be  summarized  more  formally.  The vari- 
** 
** 




ances of  home employment (u;) and  foreign employment  (uL)  z  under fixed 
ULlN  = [(YL -  ;L)/m2d + (YL./OI)  YpUp 
(FZ) and flexible (FL)  exchange rates given the symmetry assumption are 
2  22  2 
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According to the theory of  international  financial markets developed  and 
elaborated  during the  1970s a necessary  and  sufficient condition  for steril- 
ized intervention policy to have effects on the exchange rate and interest rate 
is that  securities  denominated in  different  currencies  be  imperfect  substi- 
tutes. Recently  this proposition has been challenged: it has been argued that 
securities  being  imperfect  substitutes  is neither  a necessary  nor a sufficient 
condition for intervention  policy  to have   effect^.^'  That is, proponents  of 
this  view  argue that resolving  the debate about  whether  securities denomi- 
nated  in  different  currencies are imperfect  substitutes  in  private  portfolios 
would not settle the issue of whether sterilized intervention has effects. 
The argument that intervention  policy can alter the exchange rate even if 
securities are perfect  substitutes  is considered  first. According  to this argu- 
ment, sterilized intervention  would not affect the exchange rate if it did not 
alter expectations about the future values  of  other variables, perhaps  most 
importantly  monetary policy  instruments. However, it can have effects if  it 
does alter  expectation^.^' Some may regard this argument as a useful exten- 
sion of previous theory. Others may regard it as simply a precise restatement 
of  an  argument often used  to justify intervention  under the adjustable  peg 
41.  Stockman  (1979) provides  a clear statement of  both  parts  of  this  argument.  Obstfeld 
(1980, 1982~)  develops the second part. 
42.  Stockman (1979) has explicitly modeled the possible effects of intervention on expecta- 
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Bretton Woods system.  In any case, the argument is not just a trivial special 
case of the proposition  that any policy action might  alter expectations.  In- 
tervention policy and monetary policy are often, if  not always, in the hands 
of  the same authorities.  Furthermore,  losses on foreign exchange positions 
can  lead  to significant political  problems  for the  authorities.  Thus,  if  the 
authorities  undertake  an  intervention  policy  which  would  generate  foreign 
exchange losses if their pronouncements  about future monetary policy were 
not put  into effect,  there  might be more reason  for private  agents to take 
these pronouncements  seriously. However, private agents do have a number 
of past episodes  on which  to base  an evaluation of  such policy packages, 
some of which would tend to make them wary. 
The argument  that  intervention  policy  may  not  alter  the  exchange  rate 
when  securities  are  imperfect  substitutes  represents  a  more  fundamental 
challenge to previous  theory.  It has long been  recognized that the  answers 
to certain basic questions,  such as whether open market operations are neu- 
tral  and  whether  replacing  tax  financing  of  government  expenditure  with 
bond  financing  is  neutral,  depend on  whether  government  bonds  are  net 
wealth, that is, on whether private agents regard the claims and obligations 
of the government as their own. For the most part,  closed economy models 
have been used to chart this territory.  Recent contributions make clear that 
whether sterilized intervention can affect the exchange rate when securities 
are  imperfect  substitutes  also  depends  on  whether  private  agents  “see 
through”  government transactions.  The basic insight is that if private agents 
regard the authorities’ holdings of  home and foreign securities as their own, 
then when the authorities decide to alter their holdings through  intervention 
operations, private agents will simply alter their direct holdings in an offset- 
ting  way  leaving  the exchange rate  unchanged.  This  proposition  is  valid 
whether or  not private agents regard  home and  foreign  securities as imper- 
fect substitutes because of exchange risk. However, it does depend, just as 
the  more familiar  closed economy  neutrality  results  do, on the absence of 
contemporaneous  distribution  effects  and  the  presence  of  consumers  who 
either live as long as the (perhaps infinitely lived) government or make be- 
quests  that  represent  the  first  step along  the  “time-consistent”  path  that 
maximizes the utility of  enough (perhaps all) future generations of their off- 
spring. 
The discovery that intervention operations do not affect the exchange rate 
under  some fairly  strong but nonetheless  interesting assumptions is signifi- 
cant  in and of  itself.  More important,  it adds urgency to the investigation 
already  under  way  of  the  theoretical  basis  for asset  demand  functions  in 
open  economies  and  suggests  that  this  investigation  may  need  to  focus 
somewhat  more  on  contemporaneous  and  intertemporal  distribution  ef- 
fect~.~~  Some of the results of this investigation are consistent with the type 
43. Participants in  this investigation include Kouri  (1977), Frankel (1979), and  Dornbusch 
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of  asset demand functions used earlier in this paper; the one discussed here 
obviously is not. 
11.10 The Effects of Intervention Operations: The Empirical Evidence 
A brief  discussion of  empirical evidence that  bears  on  the  question  of 
whether intervention operations affect the exchange rate is in order. Atten- 
tion is focused on two classes of  empirical work: (1)  tests of  the joint hy- 
pothesis that securities denominated in different currencies are perfect sub- 
stitutes because agents are risk neutral and that expectations are rational and 
(2) what are called direct tests for effects of  intervention.44 
Under the joint hypothesis the “ex post excess return,”  defined either as 
the  difference  between  interest  differentials  and  actual  exchange  rate 
changes or equivalently as the difference between forward rates on maturing 
contracts and  realized  spot  rates,  should  be  white  noise.  Although  some 
early studies did not reject the joint hypothesis, it has been rejected in most 
recent studies, some of  which incorporate refinements in the testing proce- 
dure.  45 
At first, rejections of the joint hypothesis were viewed as evidence against 
rational expectations.  More recently,  they have  been  regarded  as refuting 
the hypothesis of perfect substitutability and providing evidence in favor of 
the existence of a “time-varying risk premium.”  Of  course, neither of these 
interpretations is strictly correct. The rejections cast doubt on  both compo- 
nents of the joint hypothesis. They are certainly consistent with intervention 
operations affecting exchange rates.  However, even if they are interpreted 
as evidence  in favor of  a variable risk  premium  and, therefore,  imperfect 
substitutability, they do not necessarily imply that the authorities can alter 
the risk premium and, thus,  affect exchange rates with  intervention opera- 
tions. 
The ambiguous implications of efficiency tests whet the appetite for more 
direct tests for effects of  intervention. Such tests have been  performed by 
Dooley and Isard (1982), Frankel (1982a, 19826), and Obstfeld (1983):  All 
these studies focus on the dollar-deutsche  mark exchange rate.46 Although 
they differ significantly in details, the Dooley and Isard and Frankel studies 
44.  Genberg (1981) and  Obstfeld (39826) survey empirical work relevant for assessing the 
likelihood that intervention policy has significant effects.  Dooley (1982) points out that since 
1973 the intervention policies of  several major industrial countries have generated only minor 
changes in the relative supplies of bonds denominated in those countries’ currencies. However, 
the smaller industrial countries  and  the developing countries have denominated an  increasing 
share of  their total net  debt  in  the currencies of  the major countries and have generated rela- 
tively large changes in the relative supplies of bonds denominated in the currencies of the major 
industrial countries. 
45.  Recent  studies  include Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Meese and  Singleton  (1980).  and 
Cumby and Obstfeld (1981). 
46.  Hooper and Morton (1982) have performed similar tests for the weighted average dollar. 
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use the same general approach. Estimating equations are obtained by  solving 
asset demand  functions for  the  risk  premium  and  then  imposing  rational 
expectations. The ex post excess return is regressed on an asset stock (and 
in the first Frankel study on some other variables). In the Dooley and Isard 
study the coefficient on the asset stock is of  the correct sign and in the best 
regression nearly  twice its standard error.  However, the  authors conclude 
that  their particular representation of  the portfolio balance model explains 
only a small part of  the variation  in the ex post excess return. Among the 
many regressions run in the first Frankel study there are no significant coef- 
ficients on asset stocks (or any other variable) and coefficients are often of 
the wrong sign. In his second study Frankel imposes restrictions implied by 
mean variance optimizing and manages to obtain an  asset stock coefficient 
of the correct sign, but that coefficient is not significant. The results of these 
studies are consistent with the view that dollar and deutsche mark securities 
are very  good  substitutes since changes in  asset  stocks cause little or  no 
change in expected return. According to this view intervention operations of 
reasonable size do not have very much effect on the exchange rate. 
The  results  of  the  Obstfeld study are  quite similar.  Obstfeld estimates 
structural equations for German sight deposit demand, German sight deposit 
supply, German demand for deutsche mark securities, and foreign supply of 
deutsche mark  securities as  well  as  a reduced-form  equation for German 
consumer  price  index  inflation.  The  differential  between  Euro-deutsche 
mark  and Eurodollar interest rates is used  as a proxy for the expected rate 
of deprecation of  the deutsche mark. Obstfeld finds evidence of  lagged ad- 
justment  of  actual quantities to  long-run desired quantities in  three  of  his 
four structural equations. He simulates two transitory intervention operations 
under the assumption that  market participants have perfect foresight. Each 
operation is reversed after 9 months. The first operation  is a nonsterilized 
intervention operation that reduces the German monetary base by  10% of  its 
January  1979 level. This operation causes an immediate 3% appreciation of 
the  deutsche mark.  Then  the  deutsche mark  begins  to  depreciate because 
market  participants know  that the operation will  be  reversed. The  second 
operation is a sterilized intervention operation of  equal magnitude. This op- 
eration causes an  immediate appreciation of only 0.04%. These results sug- 
gest that  sterilized exchange market  intervention  operations have  virtually 
no effect on the exchange rate. 
Appendix 
The model of the text is a linear approximation to the one sketched out here 
at a zero disturbance,  balanced  trade equilibrium where endogenous vari- 
ables take on their constant expected values represented by the variables with 394  Dale W. Henderson 
bars  over them. In a linear approximation,  output coefficients  in aggregate 
demand equations  are familiar marginal propensities to spend, and balance 
sheet constraints  imply  straightforward  relationships  among coefficients  of 
asset demands. Units are defined so that E  = $ =  = 6’  = 
W  = 1;  thus the differentials of E,  P, P, Q, Q, W,  and W are equal to the 
differentials of their logarithms.  Symbols are defined at the end of  the Ap- 
pendix.  Coefficients displayed  below  or beside an  equation  are the  coeffi- 
cients of the approximation to that equation. 
The  aggregate  demand  equations  for  the  home  and  foreign  goods  are 
given by 
-  -  - 
= 6 = 
-  *  *  * 
**  ** 
PY  = h(E$/P){PY + EPY -  c[a(r,  a(PY + EPY) - (A 
+ &I}  + Pa, 
y, = h(1 -  ca), 
y2  = caJ, 
y4  = h’(Y + T.,  + h(l - c& 
Ys = hc(N + 0, 
* 
y3  = ca:Y,  y6  = hC(A  + A), 
**  ** 
EPY  = [l -  h(E;/P)]{PY + EPY -  c[a(r,  *r)(PY 
+ E;?) -  (A + ;)I}  -  E$a, 
= (1 - h)(l -  ca),  y4  = h’(Y+ T.,  + h(l - ca,;, 
* 
$2  = ca,Y,  $5  = (1 - h)c(M + B), 
* 
jC3  = cqY,  $6  = (I -  h)C(A f 2). 
In equations (Al) and (A2), h(*)  represents a function with A’(.)  > 0;  in the 
expressions  for yj and $,,  j =  1, 4, 5, and 6, and everywhere  else in the 
paper h represents  the  value of h(.) at the zero disturbance,  balanced  trade 
equilibrium.  It is assumed that 0 < h, ca < 1, and that a,,  a:, and h’  > 0, 
so all the  approximation  coefficients are positive,  and 0 < y,, $, < 1. In 
deriving y2, y3, y2, y3,  and y4, use is made of the facts that in equilibrium 
h(Y  + Y)  = Y, and  (1 - h)(Y + u) =  Y, and  that  with  balanced  trade 
hY  = (1 -  h)Y. The product ca is represented by s  in the text. 
** 
*  *  * 
* 
Expressions  for A  + 2,  r, and  are 
* 
-  (‘43)  A  + A  = M  + B  + E(N + F), 
r  = i - (c  - Q)/Q = i - (E -  E)/E - (Q - Q)/Q, 
+  *  *  ** 
*  ** 
-  (A4) 
(‘45)  ?  =  + (E -  E)/E - (Q - Q)/Q = i -  (Q - Q)/Q, 395  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
where 
* 
(A61  Q  = hP  + (1 - h)EP, 
(A71  Q  = hP/E +  (1 - h)P, 
*  * 
-  -  __ 
and  and 6  are obtained by  replacing P, E, and F  with P, E, and $. The 
production functions for home and foreign output are given by 
and  the  marginal  productivity  conditions  for  home  and  foreign  firms  are 
given by 
W/P = ~Px&,L'~-',  I, = e%&,(1-~,)L~1-*, 
**  ****  **  ** 
('41 1)  W/P = x&lLxl-l,  7, = X&,(l  -  x1)Lx1-2. 
- 
Replacing  -  P and L with 7  and Lf  yields w;  replacing ? and 
yields  W.  It  is  assumed  that  0 < XI,  XI < 1,  so xI, 
positive. 
(A  12) 
with $ and if 
11, and  I, are 
*  *  * 
The nominal wage indexing rules are given by 
The asset market equilibrium conditions are given by 
('414)  M = PYA[i,  T + (E -  E)/E] + P(y + 6), 
m, = YA, m2  = h, m3 =  -YhI, m4  =  -YX2, 
*** 
(A  15)  EN  = EPYv[i - (E  ~  E)/E,  ?I, 
**  *  **  ** 
nl = Yv,  n2 = v,  n3 = -  Yvl,  n4 = -  Yv2, 
T  *** 
(A  16)  B  = k[i - z  - (E -  E)/E][A  + 2 -  PYA(*) -  EPYv(.)] 
- P(Y -  E), 
b, = km,,  * 
b6  = k'(A -  N) - kn4, 
b2 = km2,  67  = kF, 
b3  = k'(A - M>  + km3, 
b4  = k'(A -  M) - kin,, 
bS  = k'(A -  N) + kn3, 
b8 = kn,, 
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*  EF  = {I  ~  k[i - I  - (E -  E)/E]}[A  + 
It is assumed that 0 < k < 1; that  A,  $, k', (A -  M),  and (2 -  N) > 0; 
and that  Al, A2, t,,  and C2 < 0. These assumptions  imply that all the asset 
market  approximation coefficients  except b4 and  b6  are positive.  The as- 
sumption that  wealth holders  in both  countries  regard the three assets they 
hold  as  strict  gross substitutes  implies  that  b4 and  b6 are positive, that  is, 
that  the  positive  effect  of  the  increase  in the ratio of  wealth  minus  money 
demand that home (foreign) wealth holders want to hold  in home securities 
exceeds the negative  effect  of  the  increase  in  home  (foreign)  money  de- 
mand. In the equilibrium at which the approximation is made (1) an increase 
in  productivity  leaves the  demands for home  money  and  home  securities 
unchanged  since m, = m2x2 and  b1 =  b2x2 and  (2) actyal  weaJth  equals 
desired  wealth  in  both  countries, that  is, A  = aY  and A  =  aY. Adding 
(A14), (A15), (A16), and (A17) yields the identity (A3), so only three of 
the four asset market equilibrium conditions  are independent.  In  this paper 
the equilibrium condition for foreign currency securities,  (A17), is not used. 
An assertion made in section  1 I .3 requires proof. No matter what the size 
of  ye, C2 + C3  and mLC2 + bLC3  are positive: 
*** 
(A 17)  * 
-  PYA(*) -  EfYv(*)] - Ef(6 + E). 
c2  -f c3  = [(Y2 + Y3)h -f  Y4 + Y5l(bi - mi) + Y2[b7 
+ (1 - k)(m, + mdl > 0, 
m~C2  + bLC3  =  lo12 + ydh + y4  + Y,I(~L~,  -  bLm,) + ~2m~b7  > 0. 
Some assertions made in section  11.4 require proof.  It follows from the 
definitions of  y, and y6  under equation  (Al) that y,, y6 +  0 as c -+  0 and 
that y6 > y, for all c > 0. If  indexing is complete (F =  I), then 
fi~c2  + b~c3  = y,mLb7  + (y5  -  Y6)(f&bI  - 6Lm,) 
If  y5,  y6 -+ 0 or  if  b, is  finite  and  y, > y, > 0 are small  enough,  then 
mLC2 + bLC3  is  positive.  However,  as b, +  x, then, for all y6  > y5 > 
0, mLC, + bLC3 < 0. 
Some assertions  made in  section  11.5 require  proof. The effect  on the 
exchange rate of  a shift in  asset preferences  toward home money and away 
from home securities (y > 0) is given by 
Cly  = (1/AI)LyL(m3 - b - km) + y2mL(l -  k)l, 
A, = CyLm  + m0)b + (yLm3 + m02)b7 + kmLm4y + yLm4km > 0. 
The effects on the  interest  rate, the exchange rate, and employment of  an 
expected helicopter  drop in the  next  period  of  home  money  and home se- 
curities that  would  change stocks of  both  of  these  assets  and the expected 
price of the home good and the expected exchange rate by  the same propor- 397  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
;I$  = (I/A,)[mLyb  + kmLm4y + (yzmL -  m4yL)b7], 
216  = (l/Al)(y,mb  + yLm4km), 
i/$  = (l/A,)(ymb + y2mb7 + m,ykm). 
In  deriving the expressions reported above, use has been made of  the defi- 
nitions of  the approximation coefficients supplied earlier in the Appendix. 
The definitions of b, m, and y are the following: b = b4 + b5, m  = m3 + 
m4, and y  = y2 + ye. Account has been taken of two implied relationships: 
bL = kmL and b3 = b4 + km. By  the gross substitutes assumption, m3 - 
b - km  = m3 - bi is negative, so 2I-y  is negative if 0 < k < 1 is close 
enough to one (that is, if  the employment responsiveness of the demand for 
money and the demand for home securities are similar enough in absolute 
value). If  b is large enough (that is, if home currency and foreign currency 
securities are close enough substitutes), 2ly is definitely negative. If  m4 is 
small enough (that is, if  the demand for home money is insensitive enough 
to the foreign interest rate adjusted for exchange rate expectations) or if  b 
is large enough, ;I$  is positive. Both 21;  and ilg  are definitely positive. 
The symbols are defined as follows: 
P  = home currency price of  home good. 
P = foreign currency price of  foreign good. 
E  = home currency price of  foreign currency. 
Y  = aggregate demand for and aggregate supply of home good. 
Y  = aggregate demand for and aggregate supply of foreign good. 
A  = home residents’ wealth measured in home currency. 




h(.) = proportion of  spending allocated by home and foreign residents 
c = speed of adjustment of actual to desired wealth by  home and 
to home good. 
foreign residents. 
a(.) = desired ratio of  wealth to income for home and foreign residents. 
r  = expected real interest rate on home securities. 
r  = expected real interest rate on foreign securities. 
i = nominal interest rate on home securities. 
i  = nominal interest rate on foreign securities. 
* 
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Q  = home currency price of world consumption bundle. 
Q  = foreign currency price of world consumption bundle. 
W  = home currency money wage of home residents. 
W  = foreign currency money wage of  foreign residents. 
L  = employment in home country. 
L  = employment  in  foreign country. 
M = supply of  home money measured in home currency. 
B  = supply of home securities measured in home currency. 
N  = supply of foreign money measured in foreign currency. 




A(-) = inverse of  velocity  in home country. 
v(-) = inverse of velocity in foreign country. 
k(-) = proportion of wealth  minus money demand held in home securities 
* 
by home and foreign residents. 
Comment  Rudiger Dombusch 
Henderson’s paper is a comprehensive and definitive assessment of what can 
be said about intervention.  It offers little encouragement to anyone who had 
hoped  that  intervention,  following  easily  identified  rules,  might  do away 
with volatility  and unnecessary swings in foreign exchange markets. On the 
contrary, it  concludes that there are few instances where intervention  is de- 
cidedly called for. 
The Approach 
Henderson  analyzes  foreign  exchange market  intervention  in  terms  of  a 
simple general equilibrium  model.  Its virtue is that asset  markets  are mod- 
eled with great care and are rightly identified as central to the issue of  inter- 
vention.  Henderson distinguishes between  sterilized  and nonsterilized  inter- 
vention:  In  each  a  purchase  of  foreign  exchange  by  the  authorities  is 
associated with  a change in the relative  supply of assets in the hands of the 
world public.  However, in the case of  nonsterilized  intervention  there is  an 
increase in money relative to outside debt, and in the sterilized case outside 
debt rises relative to  money.  Sterilized intervention thus becomes a change 
in the currency composition of the world stock of outside debt whereas non- 399  Exchange Market Intervention Operations 
sterilized intervention changes the currency composition of the world money 
It  is generally  accepted  that changes  in the  currency composition  of the 
world  money  stock  should  exert effects:  money  is  the  medium  of  trans- 
actions and thus there is no foreign demand for home money. Even in mod- 
els of currency  substitution-the  theoretical  basis  of  which  has never been 
established-changes  in the composition  of  world  money  exert effects be- 
cause of  imperfect  substitution.  In  Henderson’s  paper  there  is no external 
money demand and therefore  the role of  imperfect asset substitution is re- 
served, rightly,  for interest-bearing  assets.  It serves as the channel through 
which intervention,  by way of sterilization, can affect relative asset supplies 
and thus equilibrium asset yields,  aggregate demand, output, and prices. 
Henderson’s  model  is cast in  macroeconomic terms in that  it  establishes 
a link between money and bond markets and provides for transmission chan- 
nels between assets and goods markets. But cutting through these details the 
central  point  of  the  finance-theoretic  approach  remains  a  link  between  the 
depreciation-adjusted  interest rate differential and the risk premium on home 
securities: 
(1)  i-i*-  ele = 0(B/eW, . .  .); 0’ 2 0. 
The risk premium,  0, will be an increasing function of the supply of domes- 
tic currency  assets relative to world  wealth,  Blew. This equation is central 
to  intervention  in  that  it shows the relative  supply of  assets as one of  the 
determinants  in the interest rate-exchange  rate relation. Suppose, for exam- 
ple,  that  domestic  interest rates  were  increased  but  the  exchange  rate  and 
depreciation  rate  were  to remain  unchanged.  Equation  (1) suggests  that  a 
change in the relative  supply of  domestic currency  assets will do the trick 
by  generating a matching increase in the risk premium.  Sterilized interven- 
tion then is nothing but management of  the risk premium. 
supply. 
The Key Results 
Two results come clearly out of Henderson’s analysis: first, nonsterilized 
intervention is effective.  If  in the face of  exchange depreciation the central 
bank  sells foreign exchange and reduces the home money stock, then  such 
intervention cannot fail to dampen the exchange depreciation.  Second, ster- 
ilized  intervention  is fhe appropriate  policy  initiative whenever  the  distur- 
bance is a portfolio shift between home and foreign currency debt. Sterilized 
intervention in this case avoids the spreading of purely financial disturbances 
to interest rates, prices,  and exchange rates. 
The case for sterilized intervention, when disturbances are primarily port- 
folio shifts, is parallel  to the  standard Poole argument that  rates  should be 
pegged and supplies endogenized whenever asset demands are random.  It is 
here applied, not to the interest-bearing versus non-interest-bearing govern- 400  Dale W. Henderson 
ment debt, but rather to the currency denomination of debt. Thus, whenever 
there  is a shift out of  United  States dollar T-bills into French  franc bonds, 
the  United  States  government,  or the  government  of  France, would  retire 
dollar debt and issue French franc-denominated  debt. Henderson rightly em- 
phasizes that it  is rarely the case that we can identify disturbances as being 
clearly financial  as opposed  to real. Therefore  the  accommodation  rule re- 
tains its interest primarily for those cases where portfolio shifts predominate 
relative to real disturbances. 
In  the general case where disturbances can be either real or financial and 
can originate on the demand or supply side, not much can be said. Hender- 
son considers  two policy  settings: constant  aggregates  (money and bonds) 
and constant  rates (exchange  rate and  interest  rate) and  asks which  setting 
provides more stability in output and prices. The comparison can be readily 
made in terms of  figure  1 1 .C.  1, where AD, is the aggregate demand sched- 
ule  along  which  the  interest  rate  and  the exchange  rate  are held  constant, 
and AD,  is the schedule along which aggregates (money and debt) are con- 
stant. The latter is flatter (assuming that certain elasticity conditions are sat- 
isfied) since a decline in the price level raises real balances and brings about 
a fall in interest rates and a depreciation,  both of  which increase aggregate 
demand.  By  contrast,  along  AD, the  aggregate  demand  schedule  slopes 
downward  only because  a decline  in prices  enhances external competitive- 
ness. 
It is immediately apparent from the diagram that an adverse supply shock 
shifting AS  to AS' will  bring  about a larger  increase  in  prices  and smaller 
decline  in  output  when  rates  are  held  constant  as opposed  to  aggregates. 
When rates are held constant money is accommodating and the supply shock 
finds its way into prices,  not interest rates. Figure  11.C.2 shows the impact 
of  a  fiscal  expansion  or  an  increase  in  net  exports  under  the  two  policy 
settings.  Under a rates  constant policy  the income  expansion is accommo- 
0  Y 
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dated through an increase in money. With less crowding out, the shift of the 
aggregate  demand schedule  is  larger  than  that  of AD,.  Thus with  a  rates 
constant policy demand disturbances exert larger impacts on output and on 
prices  than  is  the  case with  constant  aggregates.  Which -policy setting  is 
more conducive to stability then depends on the relative preference for out- 
put  and price  stability  and  the  relative  prevalence  of  demand  and  supply 
disturbances.  But the answer does not stop here.  In a realistic model there 
would be exchange rate effects on the aggregate supply side-through  wage 
indexing  or materials  prices-and  once that occurs the  apparent  sharpness 
of the analysis in figures  1 l.C.l and  ll.C.2  goes away altogether.  Hender- 
son’s paper is valuable in showing so strongly that pure portfolio shifts apart 
there  is  no case whatsoever  for sterilized intervention  as a generally  good 
idea. 
The Intervention Problem 
Henderson’s  analysis  is carefully placed  in  a macroeconomic,  stochastic 
model.  Policymakers  face uncertainty  about  the  disturbances  that  hit  the 
economy  and are offered  alternative  policy  menus  to select so as to mini- 
mize the asymptotic variances of  output and prices. The analysis could, and 
indeed  should, also take  into  account  other policy  objectives  such as real 
interest rates, which surely matter for the medium-term question of growth. 
Needless to say, introduction of further trade-offs only weakens the chances 
that  one rigid  setting-sterilized  intervention-should  be  optimal.  Indeed, 
we  would  move  further  in  the  direction  of  Henderson’s  conclusion  that  a 
managed float would be appropriate. 
The intervention  issue  arises  in  practice  in  two possible  settings.  First, 
should the authorities  intervene to reduce  “noise”  in  the foreign exchange 402  Dale W. Henderson 
market? Here we are concerned with day-to-day fluctuations and for the sake 
of  the  argument  we  might  assume that  there  is  no  uncertainty  about  the 
trend.  I can see neither harm nor great advantages to such intervention.  One 
argument is that if the spot exchange rate moves a lot, under these idealized 
circumstances, it is presumably  because it matters very little. Alternatively, 
noise may  be a reflection of the fact that there is insufficient private specu- 
lation, which  would  be  the case if  there  were  uncertainty  about  exchange 
rate trends. Thus intervention in the case of noise strikes me as sensible only 
if the central bank can confidently announce financial stability and take bets 
on it with risk-averse  and doubtful speculators. 
The more  serious  intervention  problem  is  the  one  we  face today.  Ex- 
change rates have gone far out of line. The real exchange rate of the dollar 
stands more  than  10% above its  average of  the  1971-81  period  and  more 
than  15% above the average of  the last  5  years. The exchange rate  swings 
have exerted a major impact on growth and on international inflation differ- 
entials.  Most  important,  the  overvaluation  is  the  consequence,  not  of 
changes in  portfolio  preferences, but  rather  of  policy  decisions  to control 
inflation  in the United States. Henderson does not address this critical issue: 
When one country goes on a disinflation course, is it possible to use inter- 
vention  and  is it advisable to do so? This strikes me as the most important 
instance where the intervention  issue  arises, because  it  is  in this  case that 
real exchange rates move so very far from their long-run averages. Hender- 
son’s comparative static  analysis cannot  answer that  question,  since it  is 
concerned  with  alternative  scenarios of  inflation  stabilization, credibility, 
and expectations formation. This is regrettable because the case of  interven- 
tion  response to dyssynchronized inflation  stabilization  is one of  the  most 
serious international  financial issues. 
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